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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 1, 2007, Bolivia informed the World Bank of its decision 
to denounce the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Conven-
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tion).! On July 9, 2009, Ecuador followed suit.2 Both Bolivia and 
Ecuador sought to divest the International Centre for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an investor-state dispute res-
olution forum, of jurisdiction to decide disputes involving them. 
Bolivia and Ecuador are the only states to denounce the ICSID 
Convention, but their denunciation comes at a time of much 
debate about ICSID's "legitimacy."3 Attempting to avert a "legiti-
macy crisis," often without defining the term and assuming a com-
mon definition exists, various individuals have proposed a myriad 
of reforms, ranging from creating an appellate body to influencing 
the direction of ICSID's jurisprudence to rooting out perceived 
institutional bias.4 
The lack of theoretical precision in discussing ICSID's legitimacy 
is not surprising. Scholars have not directly addressed the question 
of what makes an international adjudicative body legitimate. 
Although various authors have discussed the legitimacy of 
nonadjudicative international institutions, U.S. courts (particularly 
1. See Letter Denouncing the ICSID Convention from David Choquehuanca Ces-
pedes, Foreign Affairs Minister, Republic of Bolivia, to Paul Wolfowitz, President, World 
Bank (May 1, 2007), reprinted in 46 LL.M. 973 (2007) [hereinafter Bolivia Denunciation of 
ICSID Convention]; see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
2. See "Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention," ICSID 
News Release (July 9, 2009), available at http://icsid.woridbank.org/icsid/FrontServlet? 
requestType=casesRH&actionval=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&From 
Page=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20. 
3. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Priva-
tizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521 
(2005); William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and 
the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'y 199 (2008); 
Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 
8 SAN DIEGO INT'L LJ. 345 (2007). 
4. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 3, at 1524 (suggesting the creation of an "independent, 
permanent appellate body with the authority to review awards rendered under a variety of 
investment treaties" as a manner of enhancing legitimacy); id. at 1587-1610 (surveying a 
number of different suggestions for reform to investment arbitration tribunals to promote 
legitimacy); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 373 (2008) ("Operationalizing the margin 
of appreciation of investment arbitration would help preserve the legitimacy of ICSID 
panels by defining their supervisory function, while preserving the primary responsibility of 
states to develop policy responses within their legal obligations in extreme situations."). 
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the U.S. Supreme Court) ,5 and international legal rules,6 the litera-
ture lacks a systematic attempt to unpack this concept specifically 
for international adjudicative bodies.7 
Attempting to define, identify, and analyze legitimacy challenges 
that international courts and tribunals face is useful to those seek-
ing to expose and remedy their flaws and deepens our understand-
ing of how these institutions should function. Perceptions of 
legitimacy may protect an institution from abolishment or funda-
mental alterations of its role.s Actors within the international sys-
tem-individuals, states, or nongovernmental organizations-may 
wish to preserve the legitimacy of a particular institution because 
they are committed to the substantive norms or legal regime that 
the tribunal is charged with interpreting and upholding. 
If adjudication is preferable to available alternatives, understand-
ing what makes a court or tribunal legitimate becomes essential. 
The increasing delegation of international dispute settlement to 
adjudicative bodies, or the increasing 'Judicialization" of the inter-
national system, seems to indicate a preference for resolving dis-
putes in the courtroom rather than on the battlefield or at the 
negotiating table. 9 Although international actors and scholars 
5. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. 
REv. 379 (1983); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L. REV. 
1787, 1790 (2005) (pointing out that, even in the context of U.S. constitutional debate, 
"[tJhose who appeal to legitimacy frequently fail to explain what they mean or the criteria 
that they employ"); James L. Gibson, Understandings of justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Proce-
dural justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAw & SOC'y REv. 469, 470 (1989) (noting the exis-
tence of "scholarly folklore" in the United States domestic context that the "special ability" 
of the United States Supreme Court "to legitimize government policies and actions" is 
"crucial to the political system because legitimacy engenders voluntary compliance with law 
by citizens"). 
6. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) 
(focusing primarily on international rules but referencing international institutions in his 
definition of legitimacy); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of 
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273, 290 (1997) (measuring the "effective-
ness of a supranational tribunal in terms of its ability to compel compliance with its judg-
ments by convincing domestic government institutions, directly and through pressure from 
private litigants, to use their power on its behalf'). 
7. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge 
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 596 n.3, 600 (1999) (noting that 
"[wJork on the emerging problem of international legitimacy is only just beginning" and 
that there are "relatively few discussions of legitimacy by international lawyers"). 
8. See generally James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational 
Legallnstitutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of justice, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459, 
460,471 (1995) ("Legitimacy is institutional support (diffuse support)-willingness to sup-
port the continued functioning of the institution despite disagreement with its outputs."). 
9. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in 
International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791. 
797-98 & n.18 (2007); see generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider. Not Quite a World Without 
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have made progress over the last decade toward developing a theo-
retical framework on international courts and tribunals, "the 
inquiry lacks a broad theoretical foundation,"l0 and "the field is 
still in its infancy."}} Developing a common framework for analysis 
will allow more fruitful comparative studies of international courts 
and tribunals. This Article attempts to contribute to the scholarly 
discussion surrounding international adjudicative bodies by using 
legitimacy as an organizing principle. 
This Article proposes a theory of legitimacy tailored to interna-
tional courts and tribunals. Part II begins by defining an "interna-
tional adjudicative body" as a dispute resolution mechanism-also 
called a court or tribunal-that decides disputes between litigants, 
at least one of whom is a state. The analysis is limited only to adju-
dicative bodies where states are involved as litigants because a dif-
ferent set of legitimacy-influencing factors may be present when 
only private parties are involved. Part II then lays out a theory of 
legitimacy specifically for international adjudicative bodies and dis-
tinguishes it from prior theoretical approaches, particularly those 
reliant on "legal legitimacy" alone. Borrowing in part from Daniel 
Bodansky and others, the Article defines a legitimate international 
adjudicative body as one whose authority is perceived asjustified.12 
Part II identifies the three factors that influence perceptions of 
justified authority, while Part III discusses them in depth. The fac-
tors are the fair and unbiased nature of the adjudicative body, com-
mitment to the underlying normative regime that the body is 
interpreting and applying, and the body's transparency and rela-
tionship with other democratic values. These three legitimacy-
influencing factors are deduced or drawn from state practice as 
embodied in treaty provisions giving rise to or regulating six inter-
national adjudicative bodies, as well as legal and political-science 
literature on legitimacy, and logic. The purpose of this paper is 
not to provide empirical support for these hypotheses, but rather 
to propose a framework for thinking about legitimacy for future 
debate and possible empirical testing. Part IV briefly concludes the 
Article. 
Trials: Why International Dispute Resolution Is Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. REsoL. 119 
(2006) (discussing the increasingjudicialization of international public disputes). 
10. David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals, 24 
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 401, 401 (2006). 
11. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429, 
432 (2003). 
12. See Bodansky, supra note 7, at 600. 
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II. DEFINING KEY TERMS 
A. International Adjudicative Bodies 
For the purposes of this Article, an "international adjudicative 
body" is a dispute resolution mechanism that decides disputes 
between litigants, at least one of whom is a state. Although interna-
tional adjudicative bodies traditionally decided disputes between 
states only, today individuals and corporations also participate as 
litigants. I3 This Article focuses specifically on courts and tribunals 
deciding disputes involving at least one state because different 
legitimacy-influencing factors come into play when only private 
parties are involved. For example, while closed and confidential 
proceedings may enhance legitimacy in a dispute involving only 
private actors, they may detract from legitimacy when states are 
involved. 14 
Like domestic dispute resolution fora, international ones may 
have a number of different functions. I5 For the purposes of this 
Article, however, they have one primary function-resolving dis-
putes pending before them. Specifically, they must find facts, iden-
tify and interpret relevant legal rules or "law," use secondary 
principles to fill legal gaps and ambiguities, and apply the relevant 
law to the facts at hand for the purposes of issuing a ruling. I6 
13. For example, individuals and, in some cases, corporations have standing to raise 
claims against states in various international fora. See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 1, 
art. 25 (extending the Centre's jurisdiction "to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State ... and a national of another Contracting State"); 
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 230, Mar. 25,1957,2002 OJ. (C 325) 33 
[hereinafter EC Treaty] (stating that, in specific circumstances, "[a]ny natural or legal 
person may ... institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against 
a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another 
person, is of direct and individual concern to the former"). 
14. See Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in Interna-
tional Arbitration, 14 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 121, 134-38 (2003) (discussing confidentiality in 
the public and private arbitration contexts). 
15. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 282 (asserting that, in the domestic con-
text, a court's functions may include "dispute resolution, 'social control,' lawmaking, artic-
ulating social and political ideas, protecting individual and minority rights, and securing 
social change"); Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 380 
(1978) ("[A]djudication is a form of social ordering institutionally committed to 'rational' 
decision."); Caron, supra note 10, at 405-06 (suggesting that our understanding of the func-
tions of and justifications for international courts and tribunals is enriched by political 
theory of domestic courts, as well as international relations theory). 
16. V.S. Mani adopts a similar "operational" approach to international adjudicative 
bodies, describing their role "in conflict resolution ... as principally three-fold. In the first 
place, it performs a relatively impartial fact-finding function in assessing and appreciating 
the evidential bases of the controverted claims. Second, it finds and expounds the relevant 
juridical norms in the context of the particular controversy before it. And finally, it 
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The decision makers serving on these bodies are adjudicators-
often called judges or arbitrators-designated to hear and decide 
the disputes. Litigants may appoint adjudicators at the time a par-
ticular case arises, or parties to the treaty giving rise to the tribunal 
may elect the adjudicators. For example, the International Court 
of Justice's Statute (ICJ Statute) specifies that fifteen judges are 
elected by the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council for 
nine-year terms.J7 Ad hoc judges may be appointed by a state 
before the Court if there is no judge of that state's nationality on 
the bench.l8 Under ICSID's procedures, litigants appoint their 
arbitrators when litigation begins, and if the parties do not agree 
on the composition of the tribunal, ICSID's Chairman may desig-
nate individuals to serve on it. 19 
International adjudicative bodies are established either by treaty 
or by parties on an ad hoc basis. A treaty establishing a dispute 
resolution body, often called the body's "statute," usually specifies 
its functions, designates the law it may apply, and mandates specific 
procedures. For example, the ICJ Statute specifies that the ICJ 
must apply international conventions establishing rules expressly 
recognized by contesting states, international custom, general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations, and 'judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists."20 The 
ICJ Statute also delineates the circumstances under which the ICJ 
has power to hear a dispute between states.21 International adjudi-
cative bodies may also be limited to interpreting and applying law 
within a particular substantive area. For example, the jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) comprises 
"all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the pro-
visions" of the American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of 
San Jose, so long as state parties have recognized such jurisdic-
endeavours to resolve the dispute-or at least disposes it off from the juridical plane-by 
applying those norms to the facts and circumstances of the case." V.S. MAN I , INTERNA-
TIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL AsPECTS 1 (1980). 
17. Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 3(1), 4(1), 13(1),June 26,1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
18. Id. art. 31. 
19. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, arts. 37-38. ICSID maintains a "Panel of Arbi-
trators" consisting of a list of individuals named by states and by the ICSID Chairman as 
possible arbitrators, but at the time a specific tribunal is designated, states are not required 
to draw from the Panel. Id. arts. 12-13,40. Nonetheless, the Chairman must draw from the 
Panel when he or she is called upon to constitute a tribunal. Id. arts. 38, 40; see also tbl. 2 
infra Part III.A.2.i. 
20. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 38. 
21. See id. art. 36. 
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tion.22 David Caron calls these tribunals "community-originated 
institution[s] ... created by a group of states to resolve disputes of 
concern to that community," and they mayor may not be used by 
members of the originating community.23 
To establish ad hoc adjudicative bodies, parties usually prepare a 
compromis or agreement to arbitrate that lays out how the arbitra-
tion will take place, who the arbitrators will be, what the tribunal 
must decide, and which law it should apply. The compromis may 
even stipulate the facts upon which the tribunal should rely in 
deciding the dispute.24 Caron labels ad hoc adjudicative bodies as 
"party-originated dispute resolution institution[s]," created by two 
parties to resolve a dispute between them, and before which only 
those two parties will be heard.25 
A third group of tribunals is a hybrid of traditional treaty and ad 
hoc tribunals. What might be called "administrative" treaties estab-
lish mechanisms to facilitate the creation and function of ad hoc 
arbitral panels in a particular substantive area. For example, the 
ICSID Convention establishes a secretariat and methodology for 
choosing arbitrators, contemplates the creation of uniform proce-
dural rules, and provides administrative support for disputes 
involving investors and states under bilateral investment treaties.26 
Tribunals that hear cases under the auspices of ICSID dissolve 
once the dispute between the litigating parties is decided.27 The 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Resolution Body's 
22. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 62, 
Nov. 22, 1969, OAS.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American Convention]. 
23. Caron, supra note 10, at 404. 
24. For example, during the 20th Century, countries disputing territorial or maritime 
boundaries, especially in Latin America, prepared compromises establishing questions for 
resolution, and often, rules and procedures for ad hoc arbitrations. See, e.g., Protocol of 
Arbitration with Supplementary Act, Chile-Peru, arts. 1-2, July 20, 1922, 21 L.N.T.S. 141 
(establishing which questions remained outstanding under an 1883 peace treaty for possi-
ble resolution by arbitration by the United States President); Arbitration Agreement, July 
22, 1971, 21 R.I.AA 53, 64 (U.K.-Arg.-Chile 1977), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ 
cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf [hereinafter Arbitration Agreement, u.K.-Arg.-Chile] 
(designating arbitrators, and establishing questions to be addressed, and procedures for 
arbitration) . 
25. Caron, supra note 10, at 403-04. 
26. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, pmbl., arts. 1-3, 6, 12-16. 
27. See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Rules of Procedure for Arbitra-
tion Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES 99, 124-
26 (Rules 50-52) (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basic 
doc/CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules). ICSID ad hoc tribunals 
may be reconstituted after the rendering of an award, supplementary decision, or rectifica-
tion, if the parties request interpretation or revision of the award and if each member of 
the original tribunal is willing to take part in these further proceedings. See id. 
114 The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 41 
panel system functions in a similar manner-panels are formed to 
hear specific disputes, and the WTO Secretariat provides adminis-
trative support.28 These tribunals exist within a superstructure, 
both in terms of procedure and substantive law. They cross-fertil-
ize each other in ways that regular "party-originated dispute resolu-
tion institutions" with no substantive or procedural linkages do 
not, yet they are not "treaty tribunals" or "community-originated 
institutions" either, as they are generated by an administrative 
treaty and governed by treaties between the litigating parties.29 
This Article's definition of "international adjudicative body" 
includes what Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter call a 
"supranational" adjudicative body-a tribunal "established by a 
group of states or the entire international community and that 
exercises jurisdiction over cases directly involving private parties"30 
as well as state-to-state litigation. This definition does not include 
national courts that may exercise jurisdiction over disputes involv-
ing sovereign states and private litigants. Although these courts 
may playa significant role in the "international judicial system,"31 
offer interpretations of international treaties that are binding in 
national courts, and influence decisions of other domestic and 
international tribunals, they lie outside the scope of this Article 
because they are subject to a different set of structural and legal 
constraints. For example, their membership is made up of judges 
who are all of the same nationality, their decisions are habitually 
analyzed in light of domestic law and politics, and they usually have 
enforcement mechanisms. 
This Article's definition of "international adjudicative body" 
does not require that the parties bind themselves a priori to a court 
or tribunal's rulings. Traditionally, states indicate in the treaty or 
compromis giving rise to a tribunal whether they will consider the 
tribunal's ruling binding.32 Such a commitment on the part of a 
state does not, however, determine whether a court or arbitral 
panel is an "international tribunal" as defined here. Rather, the 
28. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes arts. 1, 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
29. See generally CHITrHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF SPECIFIC INTERNA-
TIONAL TRIBUNALS 2-3 (2009) (commenting on the "uniqueness" of ICSID and WTO 
tribunals) . 
30. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 289_ 
31. See Martinez, supra note 11, at 436_ 
32. See, e.g., Arbitration Agreement, U.K-Arg.-Chile, supra note 24, art_ 14, at 70 ("The 
award shall be legally binding upon both the Parties ___ .")_ Nonetheless, Argentina repu-
diated the award. 
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characteristics described above-at least one state participant, a 
treaty or compromis giving rise to the dispute resolution mechanism, 
membership, and functions-determine whether an institution is 
an international adjudicative body. This Article's analysis of legiti-
macy focuses on international civil tribunals, not criminal ones. 
While many of the same factors may influence legitimacy of these 
tribunals, a close analysis of similarities and differences lies beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
B. Legitimacy 
At the highest level of abstraction, this Article proposes that a 
"legitimate" international adjudicative body is one whose authority is 
perceived as justified. A legitimate international court or tribunal 
must possess some "quality that leads people (or states) to accept 
[its] authority ... because of a general sense that the authority is 
justified."33 Like other theories of legitimacy, this one "attempt[s] 
to specify what factors might serve as justifications."34 This Article 
proposes that an international court is legitimate when it is (1) fair 
and unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent with 
what states believe the law is or should be, and (3) transparent and 
infused with democratic norms. 
This understanding of legitimacy of international adjudicative 
bodies goes beyond legal legitimacy. It is most similar to sociologi-
cal legitimacy, and may include components of moral legitimacy. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. usefully distinguishes between these three 
kinds of legitimacy in the context of U.S. constitutional debates,35 
and they are helpful in the international context as well. While 
33. Bodansky, supra note 7, at 600. Bodansky's article is not focused on international 
courts, but rather on the concept of legitimacy generally, and its specific applicability in 
the international environmental law realm. Nonetheless, his discussion of authority is 
applicable and useful in this context. 
34. [d. at 601; accord id. at 612 (stating that authority may be legitimated by its origin 
or source, by "procedures considered to be fair,» or by the production of "desired out-
comes"); Martti Koskenniemi, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 175, 178 (1992) (reviewing 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)) (proposing that 
legitimacy must also take account of "available notions of authentic human justice"); Jose 
E. Alvarez, The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of The Power of Legitimacy Among 
Nations by Thomas M. Franck, 24 N.Y.V. J. INT'L L. & POL. 199, 200-09 (1991) (reviewing 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)) (discussing a 
number of different approaches to defining legitimacy); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in 
EFFICIENCY, EQUrIY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLEN-
NIUM 264, 265 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (positing that the extent to which demo-
cratic values are reflected in an institution's inputs and outputs determines legitimacy). 
35. See Fallon, supra note 5, at 1794-1801. 
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legal legitimacy relies on a reasonable or "correct" interpretation 
as a matter of law, moral legitimacy "is a function of moral justifia-
bility or respect-worthiness."36 Sociological legitimacy rests on the 
belief that "particular claims to authority deserve respect or obedi-
ence for reasons not restricted to self-interest" and traces to Max 
Weber.37 
An international adjudicative body attains legal legitimacy when 
a state consents to utilize it for adjudication of a dispute or set of 
disputes, and the body limits its actions to that mandate.38 A state 
may express its consent by ratification of a treaty or compromis 
designating a particular adjudicative forum, or by agreeing to join 
a confederation or community of states that requires adjudication 
by a particular tribunal in case of dispute as a condition of admis-
sion. The test for legal legitimacy is whether a court acted ultra 
vires or within its jurisdictional limits. Legal legitimacy explains 
neither why a state perceives a court as possessing justified author-
ity (resulting in consent) nor why it continues to do so over time. 
The legal legitimacy approach denies legitimacy's "agent-rela-
tive"39 nature. As various international relations scholars recog-
nize, states are neither the sole actors in the international realm 
nor unitary actors, and their preferences may be shaped by a num-
ber of constituencies.40 These constituencies may include domes-
tic political parties, voters, elites, domestic and international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private parties. The 
decision to grant continuing consent depends on the perceptions 
of any given actor who might influence or determine state prefer-
ences. Consequently, the views of these various actors are relevant 
to legitimacy to the extent they are reflected in state preferences. 
Alternatively stated, state preferences, views, or beliefs are a proxy 
for the preferences of those who set or influence state policy. 
Legitimacy is agent-relative because different actors may have dif-
ferent perceptions-while some may believe an adjudicative body 
is legitimate, others might disagree. 
36. [d. at 1794-96. 
37. [d. at 1795. 
38. See Bodansky, supra note 7, at 605 ("Legal legitimacy is what connects an institu-
tion's continuing authority to its original basis in state consent. The authority of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, for example, derives from its Statute, to which UN member states 
consented. And the Court's continuing authority depends on its acting in accordance with 
the Statute. If it went outside or against the Statute, then its actions would lack 
legitimacy."). 
39. I thank Professor Richard Fallon for this terminology. 
40. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 192-93 
(1996). 
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The legal legitimacy approach also ignores the dynamic nature 
of legitimacy. Perceptions of legitimacy may change over time. 
Actors may alter their views on a court's legitimacy, before or when 
litigation is commenced, during dispute resolution, or after it 
issues a decision. Events subsequent to the granting of consent-
particularly if a state consented in a treaty ratified many years 
before a concrete case arose-may affect perceptions of legitimacy. 
A state may even decide to withdraw its consent to adjudication by 
a tribunal. For example, the United States withdrew its consent to 
the lC]'s compulsory jurisdiction following an adverse decision in 
the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States),41 and Bolivia withdrew its 
consent to adjudication through lCSlD in May 2007.42 Legallegiti-
macy does not explain the decision to withdraw or continue to con-
sent to adjudication in a particular forum. 
This Article's approach to legitimacy is more akin to the socio-
logical legitimacy of Max Weber and Thomas Franck, although the 
inquiry is different. Sociological legitimacy looks to whether "the 
relevant public regards" a regime, institution, or decision as 'Justi-
fied," that is, whether "particular claims to authority deserve 
respect or obedience for reasons not restricted to self-interest."43 
Accordingly, Weber and Franck ask what draws citizens and states, 
respectively, to comply with law. Although Weber's focus is on 
legitimacy in the domestic context, his influence on subsequent 
scholarship calls for an examination of his perspective.44 Franck's 
41. See Department Statement, u.s. Dep't of State, US Withdrawal from the Proceed-
ings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice Gan. 18, 1985), in DEP'T 
ST. BULL., Mar. 1985, at 64, and in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); Letter from George P. Shultz, U.S. 
Sec'y of State, to Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, U.N. Sec'y-General (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 
24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985) (terminating the United States' acceptance of compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice). 
42. See Bolivia Denunciation of ICSID Convention, supra note l. 
43. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1795; accord Bodansky, supra note 7, at 60l. 
44. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 5, at 380-82 (asserting that the most commonly-encoun-
tered definitions of legitimacy rely on a belief in a binding or obligatory quality and dis-
cussing Max Weber's conception of the term). Weber writes that "the concept of law will 
be defined as an order which depends upon an enforcement staff." MAX WEBER ON LAw IN 
ECONOMY AND SOCIE"IY 6 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Reinstein trans., 1967). 
He notes: 
!d. 
Time and again international law has been said not to be 'law,' because it lacks a 
supra-national enforcement agency. Indeed, our definition of law, too, would not 
apply to an order which is guaranteed merely by the expectation of disapproval 
and reprisals on the part of those who are harmed by its violation, i.e., merely by 
convention and self-interest rather than by a staff of persons whose conduct is 
specially oriented toward the observation of the regulatory order. 
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book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations is arguably among the 
most important relatively recent contributions to legitimacy theory 
in the international context.45 Weber seeks to determine what 
causes individuals to conform their behavior to a "legitimate 
order."46 The question posed in Franck's book is: "Why do power-
ful nations obey powerless rules?"47 This Article queries what cir-
cumstances influence the many different actors who shape state 
preferences to perceive a court or tribunal's authority as justified. 
What makes states decide to join and stay within a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism? This is a different question from what causes 
states to comply with a rule or decision and yields insights useful to 
those interested specifically in the establishment and functioning 
of international courts and tribunals. 
Since the inquiries differ, so too do the answers. Both Weber 
and Franck emphasize obligation or compliance with rules or com-
mands in their definitions of legitimacy. For Weber, individuals 
conform their conduct to a "legitimate order" when it is "valid" 
because it is viewed as "obligatory or exemplary."48 An order may 
be considered legitimate based on (1) tradition, (2) "emotional 
faith," (3) "value-rational faith," and (4) "positive enactment of rec-
ognized legality."49 What is traditionally legitimate is likely to con-
tinue to be viewed in the same light.50 Emotional faith is relevant 
when something is "newly revealed" or "exemplary" and might 
occur through recognition of a legitimate prophet.51 Value-
rational faith, on the other hand, is "that which has been deduced 
as absolutely demanded," and natural law is a prime example. 52 
Belief in legality is "the most common form of legitimacy," and 
arises either "because the enactment has been agreed upon by all 
those who are concerned," or through "imposition by a domina-
45. Franck's book was widely reviewed. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 34; Koskenniemi, 
supra note 34. 
46. See MAx WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 3, 8-9. Anthony 
Kronman asserts that Weber's sociological inquiry into law is focused on "how the beha-
viour of individuals is causally influenced by their own normative commitments to the law 
and by their beliefs regarding the similar commitments of others ... ." ANTHONY T. 
KRONMAN, MAx WEBER 12 (1983). 
47. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 3. 
48. See MAx WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 3; see also Hyde, 
supra note 5, at 380-82 (asserting that the most commonly-encountered definitions oflegit-
imacy rely on a belief in a binding or obligatory quality and discussing Max Weber's con-
ception of the term). 
49. MAx WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 8. 
50. See id. 
5!. Id. 
52. Id. at 8-9. 
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tion of human beings over human beings which is treated as legiti-
mate and meets with acquiescence."53 Weber defines 
"domination" or "authority" as 
the situation in which[] [t]he manifested will (command) of the 
ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more 
others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way 
that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the 
ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of 
their conduct for its very own sake. Looked upon from the 
other end, this situation will be called obedience. 54 
Anthony Kronman paraphrases Weber's understanding of author-
ity as the belief by the dominated in the "normatively binding qual-
ity of some principle to which the person exercising power 
makes-or may make-appeal."55 The ruler will appeal to princi-
ples of legitimation, which include tradition, legal-rational author-
ity, and charisma-three of the four categories of legitimacy 
previously identified (tradition, legal rationality, and prophetic rev-
elation, respectively) .56 
Franck's definition of legitimacy in the international context has 
some similarities to Weber's. First, he too links legitimacy to com-
pliance or obedience. Franck defines legitimacy as "a property of a 
rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward com-
pliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed 
believe that the rule or institution has come into being and oper-
ates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right pro-
cess."57 Second, Franck's idea that compliance can be derived 
from belief that a rule has come into being and operates as man-
dated by "generally accepted principles of right process," is similar 
to Weber's concept oflegal rationality, in which "the validity of the 
rules that fix the limits of legitimate authority depends upon their 
form, their status as formally correct enactments, rather than their 
specific content."58 Although Franck mentions institutions and 
process in his definition of legitimacy and spends some time dis-
cussing them, his focus is on the qualities of rules that pull toward 
53. Id. Weber also describes "belief in legality" as "acquiescence in enactments which 
are formally correct and which have been made in the accustomed manner." Id. at 9. 
54. !d. at 328. Kronman points out that Weber defines authority in a number of dif-
ferent ways, but this definition of "domination" "expresses the essence of Weber's concept 
of authority." KRONMAN, supra note 46, at 38. 
55. KRONMAN, supra note 46, at 39. 
56. See id. at 43-50. Kronman points out that although Weber lists four sources of 
legitimacy at one point, he omits "value-rational faith" in subsequent discussion. Id. at 44 
n.*; see also MAX WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIE'IY, supra note 44, at 336-37. 
57. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 24 (emphasis added). 
58. Compare id. at 19, with KRONMAN, supra note 46, at 45 (discussing Weber). 
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compliance, not the institutions or processes that promulgate 
them.59 
Franck identifies four factors that influence legitimacy: determi-
nacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence.6o Determi-
nacy "denotes a rule's clarity of meaning," as well as "the extent to 
which the rule's communicative power exerts its own dynamic pull 
toward compliance."61 Symbolic validation, ritual, and pedigree 
are defined as "the voluntarily acknowledged authenticity of a rule 
or a rule-maker, or, sometimes, the authenticity (validity) bestowed 
on a symbolic communication's recipient,"62 perhaps similar to 
Weber's "traditional authority." Coherence is linked to the consis-
tent application of rules to similar situations63 and "provides a rea-
sonable connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to 
1) its own principled purpose, 2) principles previously employed to 
solve similar problems, and 3) a lattice of principles in use to 
resolve different problems."64 Finally, adherence is the "vertical 
nexus between a primary rule of obligation . . . and a hierarchy of 
secondary rules identifying the sources of rules and establishing 
normative standards that define how rules are to be made, inter-
preted, and applied."65 
Unlike Franck and Weber, this Article focuses specifically on 
international adjudicative bodies and what justifies their authority 
for actors who set or influence state preferences. What contributes 
to perceptions of justified authority differs from what characteris-
tics of a rule pull toward compliance, although perceptions of 
authority will likely influence compliance with an international 
court's decisions. Weber, too, recognizes that authority underlies 
legitimacy, but identifies a limited set of factors that give rise to 
authority and obligation in the domestic realm only. Like Weber, 
Bodansky looks to 'Justification of authority" in defining legiti-
59. Franck's second factor, "symbolic validation," addresses process and institutions to 
some extent, but again, this is not the focus of his book. Further, he does not delve into 
the specifics of what kinds of processes or qualities of institutions provide symbolic valida-
tion. See generally FRANCK, supra note 6, at 91-110 (discussing symbolic validation, ritual, 
and pedigree). 
60. !d. at 49. 
61. [d. at 84. Nonetheless, as Franck explains, a rule's clarity is not necessarily an 
indicator of its compliance pull, particularly when its clear command produces results "at 
variance with common sense." [d. at 68. 
62. [d. at 91. 
63. See id. at 152-53. 
64. [d. at 147-48. 
65. [d. at 184. The idea behind adherence is that "a rule is more likely to obligate if it 
is made within the framework of an organized normative hierarchy, than if it is merely an 
ad hoc agreement between parties in a state of nature." [d. 
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macy, and identifies a number of contributing factors, including 
origin or source, "procedures considered to be fair," and produc-
tion of "desired outcomes."66 None of these authors, however, 
attempt to identify the specific qualities of international courts that 
lead states and other international actors who influence state pref-
erences to perceive a court as legitimate. 
This Article proposes that three factors influence perceptions of 
justified authority, or legitimacy. The first is the perception that 
the tribunal is fair and unbiased-a perception linked to its proce-
dures and decision-makers. This is consistent with the definition of 
authority put forth by Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and other 
adherents of the New Haven School: "the structure of expectation 
concerning who, with what qualifications and mode of selection, is 
competent to make which decisions by what criteria and what pro-
cedures."67 It is also similar to Weber's references to "tradition" 
and "legality," Franck's reliance on "symbolic validation," and 
Bodansky's "procedures considered to be fair." Perceptions of jus-
tified authority also arise from commitment to the underlying nor-
mative regime. When an international actor believes a court 
interprets and applies the law consistent with its own view of what 
the law is or should be, it is more likely to perceive the court as 
possessing justified authority. Moral legitimacy or the idea that 
"legitimacy is a function of moral justifiability"68 comes into play 
when an international actor views an international adjudicative 
body as legitimate only if its outcomes are morally justified. Finally, 
transparency and other democratic institutional norms influence 
perceptions of justified authority. In the absence of these factors, 
international actors are less likely to perceive a tribunal as legiti-
66. Bodansky, supra note 7, at 600-01, 612. He also analyzes democracy, public partici-
pation, and expertise as alternative bases for legitimacy in international environmental law. 
See id. at 612-23. 
67. Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse 
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM.]. INT'L L. 1,9 (1959); accordJohn Norton Moore, Prolegome-
non to theJumprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REv. 662,666 (1968) 
(" 'Authority' is used to signifY community expectations about how decisions should be 
made and about which established community decision-makers should make them. Deci-
sions made in conformance with community expectations about proper decision and 
proper decision-makers, as distinguished from decisions based on mere naked power, are 
said to be authoritative."). 
68. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1796; accord Koskenniemi, supra note 34, at 175, 178 (pro-
posing that legitimacy must take account of "available notions of authentic human jus-
tice"). But see FRANCK, supra note 6, at 208-09 (arguing that justice should not be a basis for 
legitimacy in the international context because 'Justice can only be said to be done to 
persons, not to such collective entities as states" and because "the concepts of justice and 
legitimacy are related but conceptually distinct"). 
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mate. These three factors are defined and described in Part III, 
taking into account contributors to each source, causal links 
between them, and where present, "feedback loops" between legiti-
macy and each factor. Figure 1 depicts a general overview.69 
An international court is legitimate when its authority is per-
ceived as justified. This Article moves beyond the traditional legal 
legitimacy approach and acknowledges the multifarious and 
dynamic nature of legitimacy in the context of international adju-
dication. Although this approach is most similar to Weber and 
Franck's sociological legitimacy theories, it focuses on why states 
grant (continuing) consent to adjudication in international courts, 
rather than what compels compliance with law. The approach 
taken here also considers what role morality may play within socio-
logical legitimacy. In accordance with this theoretical framework, 
Part III discusses and describes the unique factors influencing legit-
imacy for international adjudicative bodies. 
III. LEGITIMAcy-INFLUENCING FACTORS 
The three legitimacy-influencing factors identified are deduced 
or drawn from state practice as embodied in treaty provisions giv-
ing rise to or regulating international tribunals-what states actu-
ally require before consenting to a court's jurisdiction-as well as 
legal and political-science literature on legitimacy, and logic. By 
"what states require," and "state preferences" or "beliefs," this Arti-
cle refers to the preferences of actors who influence or set state 
policy. Insights concerning state practice are drawn from a survey 
of six international adjudicative bodies that vary based on a num-
ber of factors, including whether they are regional or global, sub-
ject specific (for example, human rights court or trade court, as 
opposed to "general" jurisdiction), and whether they are com-
prised of permanent courts or a series of ad hoc arbitral panels. 
The courts surveyed are the European Court of Justice (ECJ),70 the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (lTLOS), the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion (PCA), and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
69. See infra Part V fig. l. 
70. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the only court surveyed which may also 
hear cases not directly involving at least one state. EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 230. Like 
the other international adjudicative bodies listed, however, its establishment required the 
assent of a group of states. 
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Body (WTO DSB). 71 This diversity of courts and tribunals was cho-
sen to attempt to discern whether some core set of legitimacy-
enhancing provisions is present across all of them and to consider 
how they might differ from each other. It is important to note that 
it is not the purpose of this Article to provide empirical support for 
hypotheses about legitimacy-influencing factors, but rather to pro-
pose a theoretical framework for thinking about legitimacy for 
future debate and empirical testing. 
A. Fair and Unbiased Nature 
Parties must perceive a tribunal as fair and unbiased before they 
will agree to submit their disputes to it. It is difficult to imagine a 
circumstance in which a state (that is, those who shape or influ-
ence state policy) or other litigant would freely consent to adjudi-
cation by a tribunal it considers inherently biased. Consenting to 
adjudication would potentially subject a disfavored party to adverse 
rulings, reproach from the international community for violating 
international law, sanctions in tribunals where they are available, 
litigation costs, and political reprieves at home.72 Even parties who 
might consider themselves institutionally favored likely share an 
interest in unbiased tribunals because in the long-run, disfavored 
parties may prefer opting out of the dispute resolution mechanism 
rather than expose themselves repeatedly to rulings that they vio-
lated international law. 
A review of the constitutive treaties and rules of procedure of a 
number of international tribunals strongly suggests that interna-
tional actors are unlikely to view a tribunal as legitimate unless it 
contains a core set of provisions guaranteeing (1) fair process; (2) 
impartial, competent, and independent individual adjudicators; 
71. My sUIVey is limited to the European Court of Justice's Statute and Rules of Proce-
dure, and not the other courts in the European system, such as the Court of First Instance. 
Similarly, I look at the ICSID Convention and the Arbitration Rules, but not the Concilia-
tion or Additional Facility Rules which may also be used in the ICSID framework. I 
examine the Statute and Rules of Procedure applicable to the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea, not Annex VII or other dispute resolution mechanisms mentioned in 
UNCLOS. I look at the "VTO's Panels and Appellate Body (Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Working Procedures for Panels and 
Working Procedures for the Appellate Body). I, too, examine the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights' Statute and Rules of Procedure. Finally, with regard to the PCA, I 
examined the Optional Rules applicable in State-ta-State arbitrations only. The sUIVey and 
all tables were complete as of May 2008. Any amendments that may have been made subse-
quently to the statutes or rules are not included. 
72. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dis-
pute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 304 (2002) (arguing that when a state 
loses a case, its reputation is hurt among other states and its counterparty). 
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(3) impartial and independent benches and panels; and (4) unbi-
ased secretariats and registries.73 These provisions may serve as 
"[c]ues" that "validate symbolically" a tribunal.74 "Cues" with "his-
toric, social, political or metaphysical reality ... reinforce the per-
ception that ... a rule [or institution] is entitled to respect because 
its pedigree has been certified by those whose own pedigree is itself 
established, and in accordance with the requisite procedures and 
standards."75 In the language of the New Haven School, this set of 
provisions about process and decision makers may comprise part of 
"the structure of expectation"76 that underpins authority. A body's 
legitimacy may diminish if international actors perceive bias in out-
come-one class of litigants wins more often than another class of 
litigants where that class is or should be legally irrelevant. Trans-
parency, which is discussed in depth in Part III.C, plays an impor-
tant role in allowing international actors to assess whether courts 
are implementing rules in a fair and unbiased manner. 77 
1. Procedural Fairness 
An actor who influences or shapes state preferences is unlikely to 
view a tribunal as legitimate unless all parties to the litigation have 
an equal opportunity to present their views on both procedure and 
merits. As Table 1 demonstrates, provisions guaranteeing equal 
rights to parties to present their views, both in writing and orally, as 
well as equal access to written pleadings and annexed documents, 
are omnipresent across tribunals.78 For example, parties must typi-
cally transmit all of their pleadings to the other party, usually 
through the registrar or secretariat.79 If the claimant writes one 
73. This is consistent with United States domestic legal theoretical approaches to 
legitimacy. Susan Sturm asserts that " [w]idely accepted norms" of legitimate judicial pro-
cess include participation, impartiality, reasoned decision-making, and efficacy, particu-
larly with respect to determinations of liability or traditional court functions. Susan P. 
Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 CEO. LJ. 1355, 1379-80 (1991); see also 
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 382 (1978) (posit-
ing that the integrity of adjudication-without distinguishing between domestic and inter-
national contexts-must be judged by whether "the meaning of the affected party's 
participation in the decision by proofs and reasoned arguments" is "adversely affected"). 
74. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 134. 
75. [d. 
76. See McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 67, at 9; see also Moore, supra note 67, at 666. 
77. See infra Parts III.A.4, III.C. 
78. See infra Part V tbl. 1. 
79. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 43; Protocol on the Statute of the Court of 
Justice art. 20,2002 OJ. (C 325) 167 [hereinafter ECJ Statute]; DSU, supra note 28, arts. 
12(6),18; Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA], Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes 
Between Two States art. 15(3), Oct. 20, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 572 (1993) [hereinafter PCA 
Optional Rules]; Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS], Rules of the Tribunal art. 
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brief, the respondent writes one brief.80 If a second round of 
pleadings occurs, both parties will have an opportunity to present 
their views in writing.81 The same rules apply to all parties with 
regard to oral procedures, handling of witnesses and experts, and 
submission of documents.82 
The extent to which tribunals prize efficiency over flexibility in 
deadlines and the litigants' role in shaping procedure varies 
greatly. While some tribunals have explicit deadlines and man-
dates to meet them, others have none. For example, the IC] has 
no explicit time limits for pleadings submissions or rendering deci-
sions, only very weak language against unjustified delay if parties 
agree on a schedule, and a mandate that the Court make deadlines 
"as short as the character of the case permits."83 Despite the horta-
tory language, generous deadlines set in ICJ cases have led to criti-
cism of the Court's fairness and efficiency where cases drag on for 
66, Oct. 27, 1997, available at http://www.itlos.org/documents_publications/documents/ 
rules_en. pdf [hereinafter ITLOS Rules]. 
80. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 43(2); ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 
27, r. 31, at 114-15; ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 20; PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, 
arts. 18-19 (claimant files a statement of claim; respondent files a statement of defence); 
ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, arts. 44(2), 60-61; DSU, supra note 28, art. 12(6). 
81. In the ICJ, the order of pleadings on the merits is Memorial, Counter-Memorial, 
Reply, and Rejoinder, when two rounds of pleadings are deemed necessary. Rules of the 
Court art. 45, 2007 I.C]. Acts & Docs. 91 [hereinafter ICJ Rules]. In the ECJ, when an 
applicant to the Court files an application, the defendant has the opportunity to lodge a 
written "defence," which may be supplemented by the applicant's reply, and the defen-
dant's rejoinder. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
arts. 39-41, 1991 0]. (L 176) 7, as amended and corrected [hereinafter ECJ Rules]. A PCA 
Arbitral Tribunal will determine whatever further written submissions shall be required or 
may be presented, but "each party [must be] given a full opportunity of presenting its 
case." PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, arts. 15(1), 22. Written proceedings in ITLOS 
consist of memorials, counter-memorials, "and, if the Tribunal so authorizes, replies and 
rejoinders .... " ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 44(2). 
82. See, e.g., ICJ Rules, supra note 81, arts. 57, 63 (providing that both sides must pro-
duce the witnesses' names and relevant information before oral hearings and that each 
party may call witnesses from the compiled list); PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, art. 25 
(requiring parties to provide names and relevant information concerning witnesses); 
ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, arts. 69-88 (setting forth rules on oral proceedings, produc-
tion of documents, witnesses, and experts). 
83. See ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 43(3) ("within the time fixed by the Court"); ICJ 
Rules, supra note 81, arts. 44, 48. The ITLOS Statute provides similar flexibility for its 
Tribunal to decide the timing of the proceedings. See Statute of the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea art. 27, Dec. 10, 1982, United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, Annex VI, 1833 U.N.T.S. 176 [hereinafter ITLOS Statute] ("The Tribunal shall make 
orders for the conduct of the case, decide the form and time in which each party must 
conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of 
evidence.") . 
126 The Geo. Wash. Int'} L. Rev. [Vol. 41 
years.84 But deadline flexibility may afford litigants an increased 
ability to respond to political circumstances and reach a negotiated 
solution. 
Other tribunals have explicit statutory deadlines, or seek to limit 
delays and maximize efficiency.85 The WTO makes clear that pre-
cise deadlines should be set for filing written pleadings that "par-
ties should respect."86 It also sets explicit time limits for a panel to 
conclude its work.B7 The WTO Appellate Body permits extension 
of deadlines only "[iJ n exceptional circumstances, where strict 
adherence to a time-period ... would result in a manifest unfair-
ness."88 The ICSID Arbitration Rules also contain explicit dead-
lines for appointing arbitrators and issuing awards.89 The IACHR 
sets "non-renewable" time limits for respondents and alleged vic-
tims' next of kin or representatives to present pleadings, motions, 
and evidence to the Court.90 The ECj, too, contains explicit dead-
lines for some pleadings, although it allows extensions upon "rea-
soned application" and permits the President to fix time limits for 
other pleadings.91 ITLOS specifies that proceedings are to be con-
ducted "without unnecessary delay or expense,"92 and like the ICj, 
"time-limits shall be as short as the character of the case permits."93 
84. See, e.g., Sienho Vee, Notes on the International Court of Justice (Part 2): Reform Propos-
als Regarding the International Court of Justice-A Preliminary Report for the International Law 
Association Study Group on United Nations Reform, 8 CHINESE]' INT'L L. 181, 186 (2009) (not-
ing that the "perceived excessive length of time it took for the Court to complete a case" 
motivated recent efforts by the Court to streamline procedure and increase the pace of 
decision making). 
85. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 28, art. 12(2) ("Panel procedures should provide suffi-
cient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the 
panel process."). 
86. Id. art. 12(5). 
87. See id. art. 12(8)-(9). From the date of composition of a panel to a final report, 
the time should not exceed nine months unless specific circumstances apply. Id. art. 
12(9). 
88. World Trade Organization [WTO], Working Proceduresfor Appellate Review,' 16(2), 
WT/ AB/WP/5 Qan. 4, 2005), availablR at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
ab_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Working Procedures]. 
89. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 2, at 104 (putting forth the procedure 
for constituting a tribunal in the absence of previous agreement, and containing explicit 
deadlines), r. 46, at 121 ("The award (including any individual or dissenting opinion) shall 
be drawn up and signed within 120 days after closure of the proceeding. The Tribunal 
may, however, extend this period by a further 60 days if it would otheIWise be unable to 
draw up the award."). Nonetheless, there are no explicit deadlines for filing pleadings. See 
id. r. 31, at 114 ("filed within time limits set by the Tribunal"). 
90. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights arts. 40, 41 
availablR at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento.cfm [hereinafter IACHR Rules]. 
91. ECJ Rules, supra note 81, arts. 40-41. 
92. ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 49. 
93. Id. art. 46. 
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It adds, though, that the maximum time for filing a pleading is six 
months, extendable only by "adequate justification."94 The PCA's 
Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States con-
tain explicit time limits for selecting arbitrators and maximum time 
limits of 90 days ~or filing written submissions, unless "an extension 
is justified."95 Although most tribunals permit some extensions, 
usually for good cause, an emphasis on efficiency exists that is 
absent from the statutes and rules of others. 
The extent to which tribunals allow parties to shape the proceed-
ings also varies greatly. While some statutes and rules of procedure 
allow litigants to set the rules for particular adjudications, others 
assign the tribunal a much more active role in determining their 
form. For example, parties to litigation before ITLOS and the IC] 
may jointly propose changes to the rules of procedure, but these 
changes must be ruled upon by the Tribunal or Court.96 The 
ICSID Convention, on the other hand, requires arbitral panels to 
apply the agreement between the parties on procedural matters, 
unless otherwise provided in the Convention for the Administrative 
and Financial Regulations.97 Similarly, the PCA's Optional Rules 
for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States specify that disputes 
"shall be settled in accordance with these Rules subject to such 
modification as the parties may agree in writing."98 
Despite variations among tribunals, the omnipresence of provi-
sions granting equal procedural rights aimed at placing litigants on 
an equal playing field suggests that those who influence and shape 
state policy are unlikely to consent to adjudication in their 
absence. How these provisions are implemented and interpreted 
over time, however, may impact willingness to utilize a tribunal in 
the future. If international actors perceive that a court is imple-
menting a rule arbitrarily or in a biased manner, both the rule and 
94. [d. art. 59. 
95. PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, arts. 6-8, 11 (imposing time limits on selecting 
and challenging arbitrators); id. art. 23 ("The periods of time fixed by the arbitral tribunal 
for the communication of written statements (including the statement of claim and state-
ment of defence) should not exceed ninety days. However, the arbitral tribunal may set 
longer time limits, if it concludes that an extension is justified."). 
96. ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 48; ICJ Rules, supra note 81, art. 101 (stating that 
the Court may apply changes to the Rules of Court jointly proposed "if the Court or the 
chamber considers them appropriate in the circumstances of the case," excluding rules 
concerning the giving and form of judgments). 
97. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 20(2), at 111. 
98. PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, art. 1. 
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the institution implementing it may lose force. 99 The consistent 
application of procedural and substantive rules influences legiti-
macy.IOO Because many tribunals are not required to publish their 
reasoning on procedural decisions,lol it may be difficult for states 
and other constituencies to assess whether procedural decisions 
are made in an unbiased and nonarbitrary manner. 
While legal theorists prize procedural fairness, some political-sci-
ence studies of domestic and international courts question whether 
perceptions of procedural fairness affect the mass public's opinion 
of a body's legitimacy, defined either as the likelihood of compli-
ance with or acceptance of an unpopular judicial decision or gen-
eral support for a judicial institution. The mass public's (lack of) 
concern about procedural fairness is relevant because it shapes the 
views of those who set state policy. At least in the U.S. domestic 
context, the hypothesis that perceived procedural fairness induces 
compliance with unpopular legislative or judicial decisions "does 
not fare particularly well."102 In the same vein, a 1992 mass-public 
survey of E.U. residents found that perceptions of procedural jus-
tice "are of no consequence for acceptance of' an Eel decision. 103 
Nonetheless, U.S. "opinion leaders"-individuals who self-report 
99. See FRANCK, supra note 6, at 147-48. Franck refers to the idea of consistent applica-
tion of rules as "coherence," a quality which will affect the "compliance pull" of rules. Id. 
Specifically, "[ cl oherence legitimates a rule, principle, or implementing institution 
because it provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to 
1) its own principled purpose, 2) principles previously employed to solve similar problems, 
and 3) a lattice of principles in use to resolve different problems." /d. 
100. For a discussion of how the consistent application of substantive rules influences 
legitimacy, see infra Part I1I.B.2. 
10l. See ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 48 ("The Court shall make orders for the con-
duct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each party must conclude its 
arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence."). Neither 
the Statute nor the Rules require these procedural orders to be published, unlike judg-
ments, which must be read in open court and produced in a written form accessible to the 
public. See id. art. 58; ICJ Rules, supra note 81, arts. 21,94-95. Consequently, the ICJ issues 
orders on evidentiary and procedural issues which might be instructive for members of the 
bar of the ICJ and the public, but are not available for review. Similarly, the ITLOS Rules 
empower the President of the Tribunal to make some procedural decisions, such as setting 
time limits and deciding on extensions, but they contain no explicit requirement for pub-
lishing these procedural decisions or their reasoning. See ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 
59(3) (empowering the President of the Tribunal to set time limits and decide on 
extensions) . 
102. Gibson, supra note 5, at 49l. In this study, Gibson examined whether perceived 
procedural fairness affected the likelihood of compliance with politically unpopular deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court. He found no correlation. See id. 
103. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8, at 468, 477. Gibson and Caldeira define "accept-
ance" as "countenance [of] a judicial decision on an important issue of public policy as 
definitive, and ... desist[ingl opposition on the issue and refrain [ingl from attacking the 
institution for its actions." Id. at 465. 
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that they are frequently asked their opinions, attempt to persuade 
others how to vote, and are attentive to the U.S. Supreme Court-
"are more likely to report a willingness to comply with an unpopu-
lar institutional decision" the more they perceive it as fairly 
made.104 Other studies suggest that "when conflict resolution is 
believed to be impartial and objective, judicial authority is 
accorded substantiallegitimacy."lo5 Perceptions of procedural fair-
ness also have been found to relate to "diffuse support" for an insti-
tution.106 Tom Tyler found that "[i]n the legal arena citizens will 
be seen as reacting to the procedures through which court deci-
sions are made, as well as to the decisions themselves," and that 
"procedural justice" is more important to legitimacy than previ-
ously thought. 107 
Unless those who influence and set state policy believe a tribunal 
is fair and unbiased, a state is unlikely to grant continuing consent 
to adjudication or to perceive it as possessing justified authority. 
One element that may influence perceptions of a tribunal's legiti-
macy is whether it provides litigants with equal opportunities to be 
heard on both procedural and substantive matters. In some 
instances, states seem to prefer flexibility-even the ability to shape 
rules once they are before the Court-over efficiency in the rules. 
No matter how stringent a body's procedural rules might be, how-
ever, if the public or international actors perceive them to be 
applied in an inconsistent or biased manner, the tribunal itself may 
lose legitimacy. 
2. Unbiased Adjudicators, Benches, and Panels 
Just as states require fair and unbiased procedures to consent to 
adjudication, they seek to ensure controversies will be decided by 
fair and unbiased individual adjudicators and panels or benches of 
adjudicators. If international actors consider decision makers to 
be unfair or biased, they will perceive the judicial institution as 
lacking justified authority. As Edith Brown Weiss puts forth with 
regard to the ICJ, "[s]tates will be willing to submit disputes ... 
only if they are confident that their grievances will be heard by a 
Court which acts independently and treats all states parties to a 
104. Gibson, supra note 5, at 489-9l. 
105. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8, at 467 (quoting Mary L. Volcansek,Judges, Courts 
and Policy-Making in Western Europe, W. EUR. POL., July 1992, at 1). 
106. [d. at 484. 
107. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 162-63 (1990). 
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dispute equally."108 States require both independence and imparti-
ality of individual adjudicators, benches, and panels. 
Legal scholars have identified a number of factors relevant to the 
bias of individual adjudicators and courts that affect legitimacy. 
For example, Brown Weiss categorizes concerns about indepen-
dence and impartiality of the IC] into four classes: the degree to 
which individual judges are responsive to the interests of their 
home state,109 the selection process for judges and their qualifica-
tions, the extent to which judges align themselves into blocs to the 
detriment of parties to a dispute before the court, and procedural 
fairness toward state parties. 110 Former IC] President Rosalyn Hig-
gins focuses on personal qualities of judges, tenure, length of term, 
confidentiality of deliberations, and transparency of nominating 
procedures. III Higgins asserts that "independence of mind" is 
"guaranteed by strength of personal character, and supported by 
the judicial job being an end-of-career assignment, by having a real 
life outside the law, by security of tenure during the term of 
appointment, by strong leadership within a court, and by mainte-
nance of the confidentiality of deliberations."1l2 She also believes 
that nomination procedures should be more transparent for many 
national groups and that a single term of twelve years would 
improve judicial independence.l I3 
Other scholars focus on factors such as whether adjudicators are 
chosen at the time a dispute arises on an ad hoc basis or have a set 
period of tenure. For example, Eric Posner and John Yoo suggest 
that dispute resolution mechanisms where parties to litigation 
choose their adjudicators, as opposed to permanent courts in 
which adjudicators are chosen by a community of states before a 
108. Edith Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 123, 124 (Lori Fisler Damrosch 
ed., 1987). 
109. Eric A. Posner and Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, too, have looked at the voting 
patterns of judges on the ICJ to determine whether judges vote in favor of the interests of 
their home state in assessing whether the ICJ is biased. See Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de 
Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34]. LEGAL STUD. 599, 60()'()2 (2005); 
see also Eric A. Posner, The International Court of Justice: Voting and Usage Statistics, 99 AM. 
SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 130, 130-32 (2005). For a critique of Posner and Figueiredo's meth-
odology and results, see Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 135, 135-37 
(2005). 
110. Weiss, supra note 108, at 124. 
111. See Higgins, supra note 109, at 138. 
112. Id. 
113. [d. 
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specific dispute arises, are ultimately more "effective."114 They 
argue that independent tribunals impose rules and constraints on 
sovereignty, thereby reducing compliance, usage, and success of 
the treaty regime,ll5 Nonetheless, because states have either 
joined or created tribunals with increasing independence in grow-
ing numbers, they appear to prefer independence over depen-
dence.1l6 As demonstrated by the treaties discussed below, even 
treaties giving rise to ad hoc tribunals contain provisions seeking to 
ensure a high degree of impartiality and judicial independence. 
Prizing impartiality does not mean that states want judges to ignore 
the political context of a dispute; rather, states are more likely to 
authorize a tribunal to decide a dispute when "decisionmaking [is] 
premised (at least formally) on principle rather than power." 11 7 
Still others suggest that selection processes emphasizing political 
balance on a court-such as reflecting the composition of the 
Security Council on the ICJ-rather than judicial demeanor, may 
undermine the perception of a court as "a judicial rather than a 
114. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2005). Contra Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States 
Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REv. 899, 901 
(2005). Eric Posner and John Yoo suggest that judicial independence, more likely found 
in courts with permanent secretariats and tenured judges, as opposed to ad hoc arbitra-
tion, will undermine effectiveness. See Posner & Yoo, supra, at 27-28. They measure "effec-
tiveness" as an amalgamation of compliance, usage, and success of the treaty regime, but 
they acknowledge this approach has serious measurement difficulties. Id. at 28-29. 
115. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 114, at 72-74; see also Caron, supra note 10, at 404 
(noting that judges in a community-originated institution may consider themselves to be 
working for the community, and not the parties to the litigation, while judges in a party-
originated institution may perceive themselves as working for the parties alone). 
116. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 114, at 902-04, 914. As Helfer and Slaughter 
demonstrate, Posner and Yoo's hypothesis suffers from methodological and definitional 
difficulties, and more important, state behavior in prizing judicial independence by creat-
ing or joining independent courts refutes the Posner and Yoo hypothesis. See id. "The 
proliferation of courts that share these formal [independent] characteristics strongly sug-
gests, however, a growing global consensus that adjudicatory bodies outside the nation 
state should be independent." /d. at 914. "[A] thorough empirical survey reveals that 
states are doing precisely what Posner and Yoo argue they have no rational interest in 
doing: setting up more independent tribunals and quasi-judicial review bodies and using 
them more frequently." Id. at 903. 
117. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 314. While Helfer and Slaughter look at 
whether neutrality and demonstrated autonomy from political interests enhances a tribu-
nal's "effectiveness," see generally id., this Article examines whether they enhance a tribu-
nal's legitimacy-that is, whether a state is more or less likely to authorize a tribunal to 
decide a dispute if they perceive the decision makers as impartial or influenced by interna-
tional power dynamics. 
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political body."118 Monroe Leigh and Stephen Ramsey argue that 
electing judges on the same agenda and at the same time as mem-
bers of other U.N. organizations, candidates "pressing-the-flesh" at 
the General Assembly, and the frequency of elections tend to 
"increase the political pressure on the judges and decrease the per-
ception of judicial decisions made without political motives. "119 
The practice of states, as demonstrated by constitutive treaties 
and rules of procedure of various dispute resolution mechanisms, 
shows a number of options for guaranteeing individual impartiality 
and independence, as well as for creating a balanced tribunal. The 
impact of these choices on perceptions of an adjudicative body's 
legitimacy is a question for further empirical study. 
1. Individual Adjudicators 
Groups of states setting up tribunals and courts differ in their 
approaches to ensuring impartiality and independence of individ-
ual adjudicators, as demonstrated by Table 2.120 Statutes and rules 
of procedure address selection processes, term length, qualifica-
tions, content of the adjudicator's oath, obligations to disclose 
potential conflicts to parties, grounds for recusal or disqualifica-
tion, and limitations on activities before and during tenure. 
Selection procedures vary based on whether adjudicators are 
appointed or elected; whether states only or an appointing author-
ity (such as the U.N. Secretary General, the Chairman of ICSID, or 
the WTO DSB) are involved; the extent to which such an 
appointing authority is involved; and whether adjudicators are 
selected when a dispute is ripe for adjudication or every set period 
of years. As discussed above, states' choices with regard to selec-
tion procedures (election versus appointment) may increase or 
decrease perceptions of bias of individual adjudicators and percep-
tions of the underlying institution as "political" or 'Judicial" in 
nature, likely affecting perceptions of their legitimacy. If an adju-
dicator is elected by a group of states and knows which states voted 
for whom, he or she may be perceived as "owing" something to the 
states that chose him or her. On the other hand, the link between 
an adjudicator appointed by only one state or litigant may be con-
sidered to create even more bias, particularly when that adjudica-
118. Monroe Leigh & Stephen D. Ramsey, Confidence in the Court: It Need Not be a 
"Hollow Chamber, " in THE INTER.'IATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 
108, at 106, 109. 
119. Id. at 109. 
120. See infra Part V thl. 2. 
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tor has been appointed by the same litigant several times. Election 
for a set term of years or for only a single dispute may also affect 
perceptions of bias. A set term of years may increase perceptions 
of independence because an adjudicator need not "run for re-elec-
tion" or reappointment after each case. 
Required adjudicator qualifications vary based on whether sub-
stantive knowledge of a particular area of law is required, although 
statutes and rules of procedure almost uniformly require "high" or 
"highest" "moral character" and "integrity" or "independence."121 
For example, the IACHR Statute, the ITLOS Statute, and the 
ICSID Convention require "recognized competence" in the field of 
human rights; law of the sea; and law, commerce, industry, or 
finance, with a special emphasis on law, respectively.122 The WTO 
contains the most specific requirements with regard to qualifica-
tions for panel members, providing the following guidance on who 
is "well-qualified": 
[G] overnmental and/or non-governmental individuals, includ-
ing persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, 
served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party 
to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Councilor Commit-
tee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or 
in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade 
law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a 
Member.123 
While the link between preventing adjudicator bias and "moral" 
qualities is clear (although one wonders how these qualities are 
assessed), the link between qualifications and bias requires some 
additional comment. High standards for qualifications are impor-
tant both for giving credibility to the judgments of international 
courts, as well as for ensuring judicial independence and fair and 
unbiased tribunals. Judges with the right "pedigree" confer legiti-
121. See, e.g., Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 4(1), Oct. 31, 
1979, 19 I.L.M. 635 (1980) [hereinafter IACHR Statute] ("highest moral authority"); EC 
Treaty, supra note 13, art. 223 ("persons whose independence is beyond doubt"); ICJ Stat-
ute, supra note 17, art. 2 ("independent" and "of high moral character"); ICSID Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 14(1) ("high moral character" and "may be relied upon to exercise 
independent judgment"); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 2 ("enjoying the highest repu-
tation for fairness and integrity"). 
122. IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 4(1); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 2; 
ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 14(1). 
123. DSU, supra note 28, art. 8(1). Members of the Appellate Body must be "persons 
of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the 
subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any 
government .... [They] shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other rele-
vant activities of the WTO." [d. art. 17(3). 
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macyon an institution by providing greater authority to the institu-
tion and its rulings because they "link[] rights and duties 
reciprocally in a notion of venerable, authenticated status deserv-
ing special deference."124 Given the omnipresence of these treaty 
provisions, states appear to consider special knowledge, integrity, 
and conscientiousness of judges to heighten the authority of the 
tribunals themselves. One is hard pressed to find a constitutive 
treaty or rules of procedure without these requirements. 
Perhaps qualifications also serve as a tool in constraining adjudi-
cators from making overtly biased and unprincipled decisions. A 
knowledgeable and well-known judge or arbitrator will be aware of 
and engage with prevailing legal understandings, presumably mak-
ing it more difficult for that person to make a decision based 
purely on bias. Particularly where a "global community of law"125 
exists, reputational costs may be high for a judge or arbitrator who 
strays too far from the normative mainstream or is perceived as 
making decisions based on personal proclivities, and such deci-
sions may endanger her and the institution's likelihood of being 
called upon to render future decisions.126 Qualified adjudicators 
may be more aware of the "discursive constraints" they are subject 
to, and whether and how they are nested in an institutional system 
of checks and balances, as well as politics. 127 Further, judges and 
arbitrators who are part of a global community of lawyers, judges, 
and scholars who may comment on their work are more likely to be 
aware of and sensitive to both the political and normative bounda-
ries within which a tribunal operates.128 Tribunals must publish 
124. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 94; accard Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 300-01 
(noting that judges with knowledge of domestic law may assist in increasing the effective-
ness of a supranational tribunal-as opposed to staffing a tribunal with only international 
law experts-to assist in gaining acceptance of particular decisions from national judges). 
125. Helfer and Slaughter define a "community of law" as a "community of interests 
and ideals shielded by legal language and practice. It is a community in which the partici-
pants-both individuals and institutions-understand themselves to be linked through 
their participation in, comprehension of, and responsibility for legal discourse." Helfer & 
Slaughter, supra note 6, at 370. 
126. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitu-
tional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247,249 (2004); Tom Ginsburg, Bounded 
Discretion in InternationalJudicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 633 (2005) (asserting 
that international judges' lawmaking discretion is constrained by the preferences of states 
and other actors). 
127. See Steinberg, supra note 126, at 257. He notes that states might screen Appellate 
Body candidates to select for "a more restrained interpretive stance," which, in essence, 
amounts to an additional qualification. See id. at 274. 
128. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 10, at 411-14 (asserting that the structure and operation 
of international courts and tribunals can be understood as the result of the interactions of 
different groups of actors "within and against the bounded strategic space defined by the 
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judgments, dissents, separate opinions, and their reasoning for 
qualifications to affect legitimacy in this manner. This legitimacy-
influencing factor also requires a relatively high degree of judicial 
candor-adjudicators "should neither omit their reasoning nor 
conceal their motives."129 
Another mechanism states appear to value in promoting adjudi-
cator independence and impartiality is an oath or solemn declara-
tion made upon taking office. As demonstrated in Table 2, the 
obligations, specificity, and form (written, oral, or both) of the 
oaths differ across tribunals. 130 
While all oaths require "independence," "conscientiousness," or 
"honor," only some oaths explicitly require preservation of secrecy 
of deliberations or continuing obligations during and after service 
as an adjudicator.13l The IC] and ITLOS oaths do not contain 
explicit secrecy of deliberations provisions, although other provi-
sions in their statutes and rules of procedure indicate that delibera-
tions are to be secret.132 Also, some oaths mention service in an 
"individual capacity," as well as independence. For example, ICSID 
arbitrators must commit to 'Judge fairly as between the parties, 
according to the applicable law, and shall not accept any instruc-
tion or compensation with regard to the proceeding from any 
source except as provided in [the ICSID Convention] and in the 
Regulations and Rules made pursuant thereto."133 WTO Panel and 
Appellate Body members must declare they have read the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
constitutive instrument establishing the international court or tribunal"); Ginsburg, supra 
note 126, at 633 (asserting that independent courts' interpretations of international law 
are "constrained by the preferences of states and other actors"); Steinberg, supra note 126 
(discussing constraints on "judicial activism" in the WTO and emphasizing the importance 
of international legal discourse, politics, and constitutional structure). 
129. Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1309 
(1995). For additional discussion regarding transparency's impact on legitimacy, see infra 
Part III.C. 
130. See infra Part V tbI. 2. 
131. The ECj, IACHR, and ICSID require the judge or arbitrator to swear orally, in 
writing, or both to uphold the secrecy of deliberations or the confidentiality of proceed-
ings. See, e.g., ECj Statute, supra note 79, art. 2; IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 11; 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 6(2), at 106-07. The ICj and ITLOS do not 
explicitly mention confidentiality or secrecy in their oaths as described in their statutes or 
rules of procedure. 
132. See ICj Statute, supra note 17, art. 54(3) ("The deliberations of the Court shall take 
place in private and remain secret."); ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 42(1) ("The deliber-
ations of the Tribunal shall take place in private and remain secret. The Tribunal may, 
however, at any time decide in respect of its deliberations on other than judicial matters to 
publish or allow publication of any part of them."). 
133. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 6(2), at 106. 
136 The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 41 
Disputes and the Rules of Conduct, which require service "in their 
individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as 
representatives of any organization."134 The IACHR specifies that 
judges are "elected in an individual capacity," although this is not 
noted in the judicial oath. 135 Oaths and other similar provisions 
about independence and impartiality serve as additional legiti-
macy-conferring cues that "validate symbolically" a tribunal.I 36 
Tribunals also differ on obligations to disclose potential conflicts 
to parties, grounds for recusal or disqualification, and limitations 
on activities before, during, and after tenure. While some courts 
require disclosure of potential conflicts to litigating parties, others 
require disclosure only to the president of the tribunal. For exam-
ple, ICSID requires arbitrators to list potential conflicts in a written 
declaration prior to the first meeting of the arbitral panel, allowing 
the litigants to assess for themselves whether the arbitrator should 
be dismissed. 137 The WTO requires Panel and Appellate Body 
members to disclose any information "which could give rise to justi-
fiable doubts as to the integrity and impartiality of the dispute set-
tlement mechanism."138 This information is ultimately forwarded 
to the parties to the dispute. 139 The PCA Optional Rules for Arbi-
trating Disputes between Two States state that a prospective arbitra-
tor is under an obligation to disclose "any circumstances likely to 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her impartiality or indepen-
dence."14o On the other hand, the ECl, ICl, IACHR, and ITLOS 
require no disclosure to litigants. Instead, individual judges must 
approach the president of the court should they have "some spe-
cial" or "appropriate" reason for not participating in a case. 141 
While grounds for disqualification vary somewhat across tribu-
nals, all appear to allow disqualification for manifest lack of inde-
pendence or partiality. For example, many tribunals require 
disqualification if an adjudicator served as an agent, counsel, advo-
cate or adviser to one of the parties, or on another judicial body or 
134. DSU, supra note 28, art. 8(9); accord WTO Working Procedures Annex II, supra 
note 88, at VI.4(a), annex 3. 
135. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 52; accordIACHR Treaty, supra note 121, 
art. II. 
136. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 134. 
137. See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 6(2), at 107. 
138. WTO Working Procedures Annex II, supra note 88, at VI.2, VI.4(a), annex 3. 
139. [d. at VI.4(a). 
140. PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, art. 9. 
141. ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 18; ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 24; IACHR Stat-
ute, supra note 121, art. 19(2); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 8(2). 
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commission of enquiry which ruled on the same dispute. 142 The 
IACHR extends possible disqualification to instances where judges' 
family members "have a direct interest."143 In ICSID, a "manifest 
lack" of qualifications or failure to comply with procedures for 
appointment can also lead to disqualification. 144 
States have chosen different options for limiting the activities of 
judges during their tenure. For example, judges may not be per-
mitted to serve in political positions for their home countries dur-
ing their tenure. 145 Judges on the IACHR may not simultaneously 
hold positions in the executive branch of government (with some 
limited exceptions), as officials of international organizations, or 
"[a] ny others that might prevent the judges from discharging their 
duties, or that might affect their independence or impartiality, or 
the dignity and prestige of the office."146 ITLOS judges may not 
"associate actively with or be financially interested in any of the 
operations of any enterprise concerned with the exploration for or 
exploitation of the resources of the sea or the seabed or other com-
mercial use of the sea or the seabed."147 
Requirements for disclosure of potential conflicts, disqualifica-
tion provisions, and limitations on activities during tenure may pro-
foundly affect the legitimacy of a tribunal. For example, disclosure 
of possible conflicts to a tribunal's president alone limits the ability 
of the parties to present arguments on possible bias and likely cre-
ates an inconsistent standard on the appropriateness of recusal 
dependent on the views of each individual adjudicator or presi-
dent. When and how recusal and disqualification may occur is sim-
ilarly significant. Nonetheless, as with any other provision, what 
statutes or rules of procedure require and what a tribunal's prac-
tice is, are different questions. For example, although the ICJ Stat-
142. See, e.g., IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 19(1); ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 
17(2); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 8(1); ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 18. 
143. IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 19(1). 
144. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 57. 
145. See, e.g., ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 4 (prohibiting judges from holding politi-
calor administrative offices or engaging in any occupation unless they obtain an exemp-
tion); IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 18(1) (prohibiting judges from serving as 
members or high-ranking officials of the executive branch of government, officials of inter-
national organizations, any other position which might affect "independence or impartial-
ity, or the dignity and prestige of the office"); ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 16 
(prohibiting the exercise of political or administrative functions); ITLOS Statute, supra 
note 83, art. 7(1) (forbidding the exercise of "any political or administrative function" and 
any active association or financial interest in "any enterprise concerned with the explora-
tion for or exploitation of ... the seabed"). 
146. IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 18(1). 
147. ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 7(1). 
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ute requires disqualification if a judge was an agent, counsel, or 
advocate for one of the parties, individuals who were political 
appointees in litigants' previous governments when the facts giving 
rise to a dispute took place may still serve as judges ad hoc. 148 The 
implementation of these provisions is likely to have a significant 
impact on perceptions of adjudicators and institutions as fair, unbi-
ased, and independent. Despite the variation among them, the 
omnipresence of provisions aimed at reducing the bias of individ-
ual adjudicators strongly suggests they are an important prerequi-
site to recognizing a tribunal's legitimacy. 
n. Benches and Panels 
Not only do states insert provisions into constitutive treaties and 
rules of procedure regarding unbiased and independent individual 
adjudicators, but also they seek to create a kind of balance on 
panels or benches of adjudicators. In some instances, states prefer 
that neither litigant be "represented" by a national on the 
bench.l49 In others, provisions specifically affirm the right of 
judges of a litigant's nationality to retain their seats or grant liti-
gants the right to appoint a judge ad hoc if no judge of their 
nationality is already on the bench or panel.I 50 In the latter case, 
states prefer to have the opportunity to cancel out what bias might 
exist, rather than attempting to root it out a priori. Alternatively, 
states may perceive the adjudicator that they themselves appoint as 
an advocate for them who sits on the bench, rather than arguing 
before it. Nonetheless, even where national judges retain the right 
to hear a case or litigants each choose an arbitrator, the tribunal's 
president usually cannot be of the nationality of one of the par-
148. See Phillipe Couvreur, Article 17, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 337, 349 (Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat & Karin 
Oellers-Frahm eds., 2006). 
149. See, e.g., PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, art. 6(4) ("[TJhe appointing authority 
shall have regard to such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an 
independent and impartial arbitrator and shall take into account as well the advisability of 
appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties."). For 
example, individuals whose governments are involved in a WTO dispute may not serve on a 
panel unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. DSU, supra note 28, art. 8(3). 
150. See, e.g., IC] Statute, supra note 17, art. 31 (3) (allowing a party to choose an ad hoc 
judge if no judge of its nationality is on the bench); IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 10 
(affirming ajudge's right to hear a case even if the judge is a national of one of the parties, 
and permitting a state party to name ajudge ad hoc if the other litigating party has ajudge 
of its nationality on the bench or if neither litigating party has a judge of its nationality on 
the bench); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 17(3) (allowing a party to choose an addi-
tional member of the Tribunal if no member of the party's nationality is on the bench). 
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ties.l51 The ECj, on the other hand, expressly prohibits using 
nationality as a basis for challenging a judge.152 These different 
options for balancing out a panel or bench may affect perceptions 
of the dispute settlement mechanism's impartiality, fairness, and 
reputation as an adjudicative, as opposed to political, institution. 
Table 3 shows the variation across tribunals. 153 
States have also made rules and aspirational statements concern-
ing the overall makeup of panels and benches, perhaps in an effort 
to guarantee a particular kind of balance and to prevent undue 
bias. For example, no two members of ITLOS may be nationals of 
the same state, and the Tribunal as a whole must be representative 
of the principal legal systems of the world and should enjoy equita-
ble geographical distribution.154 WTO Panel members "should be 
selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, 
a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experi-
ence."155 If there is a dispute between a developing country and a 
developed country, the developing country may request that at 
least one panelist come from a developing country.156 In ICSID, 
the chairman, when designating persons to serve on panels, "shall 
in addition pay due regard to the importance of assuring represen-
tation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and 
of the main forms of economic activity."157 "The majority of arbi-
trators shall be nationals of States other than the Contracting State 
party to the dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a 
party to the dispute," unless all the members of the Tribunal have 
been appointed by agreement of the parties. 15s No two judges on 
151. See, e.g., IACHR Rules, supra note 90, art. 4(3) (requiring a president who is a 
national of a party to a case before the court to relinquish the presidency for that case); IC] 
Rules, supra note 81, art. 32(1) (stating that a national of one of the parties before the 
court may not sen'e as president for that case); ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 16 ("No 
Member who is a national of a party in a case, a national of a State member of an interna-
tional organization which is a party in a case or a national of a sponsoring State of an entity 
other than a State which is a party in a case, shall exercise the functions of the presidency 
in respect of the case."). 
152. ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 18 ("A party may not apply for a change in the 
composition of the Court or of one of its chambers on the grounds of either the nationality 
ofa]udge or the absence from the Court or from the chamber ofa]udge of the nationality 
of that party."). 
153. See infra Part V tbl. 3. 
154. ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, arts. 2-3. Further, "[tlhere shall be no fewer than 
three members from each geographical group as established by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations." Id. art. 3(2). 
155. DSU, supra note 28, art. 8(2). 
156. Id. art 8(10). 
157. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 14(2). 
158. Id. art. 39. 
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the IACHR may share nationality.159 States electing judges to the 
IC] should "bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected 
should individually possess the qualifications required, but also 
that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of 
civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should 
be assured."160 
The presence of these kinds of provisions suggests that some 
kind of overall representativeness is important to states agreeing to 
adjudication in an international tribunal, or at least, that no state 
or litigant or one perspective be overrepresented on a bench or 
panel. The WTO rule that developing countries are entitled to at 
least one panelist from the developing world is particularly interest-
ing. The implication is that if developing countries feel their per-
spectives are not understood by panelists, it undermines the 
authoritativeness of the adjudicative body's decisions. At the same 
time, it acknowledges that decisions are being made in a political 
context, where some players feel inherently disadvantaged. The 
presence or absence of balancing provisions may serve to increase 
or undermine the legitimacy of a tribunal, and is worthy of cross-
tribunal comparison and debate. The kinds of "diversity" parame-
ters states have envisioned thus far may change and evolve in the 
future. For example, increased gender diversity on the bench or 
panel might increase the legitimacy of international tribunals in 
the eyes of some international actors.l61 
Perhaps the most important indicator of persistent bias on a 
bench or panel, however, is not the structure of the panel or rules 
about nationality, but rather the institution's record. If the adjudi-
cative body always rules in favor of one class of litigants or even of 
one litigant, it is likely to be viewed as biased.l62 For example, if 
ICSID always rules in favor of the investor over the sovereign, the 
WTO rules in favor of the developed over the developing country, 
159. IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 4(2). 
160. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 9. 
161. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelley Wright, Feminist 
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613,614-15 (1991) (describing interna-
tional law as "a thoroughly gendered system" and decrying the dearth of women in the 
primary organizational structures of international law); lyiola Solanke, Diversity and Inde-
pendence in the European Court of Justice, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 89, 92 (2008/2009) ("A widely 
acknowledged legitimacy input for courts lies in the extent to which their composition 
reflects those whose lives are affected by their decisions."). 
162. See, e.g., Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias 
Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L LJ. 419, 427-29 (2000) (discussing the 
debate between Jan Paulsson and M. Sornarajah concerning whether international com-
mercial arbitration was and is inherently biased against southern states). 
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or, if during the Cold War the ICJ ruled in favor of the communist 
over the capitalist country, the losing class of litigants will question 
the authority of the institutions. The perception that the scales are 
unjustifiably tipped in one direction undermines the strength of 
adjudicative bodies. 
Not only are international actors assessing bias likely to look to 
win/loss records, but also they will examine the manner in which 
benches and panels use and shape legal doctrine. Was the out-
come "legally sound," or was it somehow divorced from conven-
tional approaches?163 Did it sound like a tirade, or was it framed in 
the prevailing legal discourse? For example, scholars assessing bias 
in the wake of Libyan oil arbitrations of the 1970s looked to "doc-
trines relied upon by the arbitrators to reach their decisions, the 
legal validity of the doctrine, and its current state of acceptance 
under international law."164 
Yet a litigant may continue to authorize a tribunal to decide its 
disputes even if its class of litigants loses most of the time, or even 
in the face of perceived bias in doctrine if other legitimacy-enhanc-
ing factors are present. For example, states may prefer to continue 
to subject themselves to liability before international human rights 
courts because of the importance they place on human rights 
norms. They prefer to compensate a victim or change their laws 
because the value of human rights outweighs the costs of participa-
tion. Similarly, a state in an investor-state dispute resolution tribu-
nal may prefer to suffer occasional losses because it believes that 
staying will make it a more attractive candidate for foreign invest-
ment. 165 This idea, which this Article calls "normative buy-in," is 
discussed in Part III.B below. 
3. Equal Treatment from Registrars and Secretariats 
For the same reasons that states require fair procedural rules 
and impartial judges, arbitrators, panels, and benches, states 
expect equality and fairness from the secretariats or registries of 
courts and tribunals. Like clerks' offices in the domestic context, 
secretariats are an extension of the tribunals themselves, and they 
play important roles in ensuring that states receive equal treatment 
and equal information. When a tribunal's officials are perceived as 
163. For discussion on the meaning of "legally sound," see infra Part III.B. 
164. Shalakany, supra note 162, at 445. 
165. See, e.g., id. at 428 (describing the argument of a Singaporean legal scholar that 
"developing countries simply must accept arbitration if they are to attract any long-term 
foreign investment"). 
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arbitrary, biased, incompetent, or unfair, states are less likely to 
authorize that tribunal to decide their dispute. This state prefer-
ence is demonstrated in various treaties giving rise to international 
tribunals requiring professional and ethical qualifications, as well 
as oaths upon taking office, for registrars and secretariat 
officials.166 
4. Transparency's Role 
To ensure that a tribunal is not acting in an unacceptably biased 
manner, states established a number of mechanisms to monitor 
fairness and promote equal treatment. Specifically, through their 
constitutive documents, states and other international actors 
demand institutional transparency from international tribunals to 
protect themselves against observable bias. 167 Transparency mech-
anisms may take the form of requiring open hearings and pub-
lished OpInIOnS in accessible languages, and information 
concerning the functioning of the secretariats.168 As a result, 
increased transparency may assist in heightening the legitimacy of 
an institution. The importance of transparency for evaluating 
whether a tribunal is fair and unbiased, as well as its power as an 
166. Registrars are often appointed or elected by members of the court or tribunal to 
set terms. See, e.g., ECJ Rules, supra note 81, art. 12(1), (4) (appointed by court to six-year 
term); IACHR Rules, supra note 90, art. 7 (elected by court for a five-year term); ICJ Rules, 
supra note 81, art. 22(1) (elected by court for a seven-year term). Qualifications are often 
quite high, and impartiality is mandated. See, e.g., ECJ Rules, supra note 81, art. 12 (requir-
ing applications for the Registrar position to include age, nationality, university degrees, 
knowledge of languages, present and past occupations and experience in judicial and 
international fields); ICSID, Administrative and Financial Regulations, in ICSID CONVENTION, 
REGULATIONS, AND RULES, supra note 27, at 51, 59 (Regulation 13); ICSID Convention, 
supra note 1, art. 10(2) (prohibiting the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General 
of ICSID from the exercise of any political function and from any other employment or 
occupation except with approval of the Administrative Council); ICJ Rules, supra note 81, 
art. 22(3) (requiring nominations for the Registrar position to include information as to 
the candidate's age, nationality, present occupation, university qualifications, knowledge of 
languages, and previous experience in law, diplomacy, or the work of international organi-
zations). Registrars are often required to swear an oath of loyalty and impartiality as well. 
See, e.g., ECJ Rules, supra note 81, arts. 3,12(5) (mandating that ajudge will take an oath to 
perform his duties "impartially and conscientiously" and to "preserve the secrecy of the 
deliberations of the Court"); IACHR Rules, supra note 90, art. 9(1) (requiring the Secre-
tary and Deputy Secretary to swear "to discharge their duties faithfully, and to respect the 
confidential nature of the facts that come to their attention while exercising their nmc-
tions"); ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 34 (requiring the Registrar, Deputy Registrar, and 
Assistant Registrar to make a solemn declaration at a meeting of the Tribunal to perform 
their duties "in all loyalty, discretion and good conscience and ... faithfully observe all the 
provisions of the Statute and of the Rules of the Tribunal"). 
167. Table 4 describes some of the specific mechanisms that states require to ensure 
transparency. See infra tbl. 4 and discussion infra Part lII.C. 
168. See infra tbl. 4 and discussion infra Part III.C. 
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independent legitimating factor is discussed in depth in Part IIl.C 
below. 
In sum, states are more likely to grant continuing consent to 
adjudication in a particular forum when procedural rules, adjudi-
cators, and secretariats and registries are perceived as fair and 
unbiased. Neither side must be viewed as favored with respect to 
appointment of individual adjudicators or benches and panels of 
adjudicators. A state is likely perceive an institution as biased and 
may withdraw its consent to adjudication if one side is perceived to 
win all the time unless other legitimacy-increasing factors are pre-
sent. Transparency also plays an important role in increasing the 
perception of tribunals as fair and unbiased in the eyes of interna-
tional actors. 
B. Buy-in to the Underlying Normative Regime 
International actors are unlikely to perceive a tribunal as author-
ized to decide a dispute if they do not support the underlying nor-
mative regime that the tribunal is interpreting and applying. A 
"normative regime" is the "law" potentially applicable by a tribunal 
to a dispute pertaining to a particular substantive area, such as that 
relevant to use and preservation of the seas, human rights, or prop-
erty rights (in many investor-state cases). These legal rules are usu-
ally initially codified in a treaty; for example, upon its entry into 
force, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea contained the 
law applicable to disputes before ITLOS for states that had ratified 
that treaty. Treaty provisions are subject to new interpretations 
over time, often in light of states' actions and understandings of 
what constitutes binding international law, judicial decisions, the 
writings of publicists, and the actions and views of other actors who 
influence the sources of international law. Thus, the normative 
regime of the Law of the Sea is arguably not the same today as it 
was in 1982. 
International actors will not perceive a tribunal to possess justi-
fied authority if the underlying normative regime lacks "currency." 
A normative regime has "currency" for an international actor when 
it believes the regime is consistent with its view of what the law is or 
should be. The currency of a normative regime may change over 
time, growing or shrinking depending on actors' evaluations of the 
normative regime'S evolution as compared to their interests and 
values. When interests and values diverge, international actors 
must decide which is more important to them in assessing a 
regime'S currency. Each time a tribunal issues a decision that 
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diminishes the currency of a normative regime, international 
actors are less likely to submit willingly their disputes to the tribu-
nal or to consider its rulings authoritative, although international 
actors' interests and values may themselves be shaped by changes 
to the normative regime. (Whether and to what extent a state or 
other international actor's preferences and interests are influenced 
by the decisions and actions of institutions and vice versa are ques-
tions of considerable debate among international relations 
scholars. 169) 
Regardless of where one stands on the international relations 
debate, at least two factors influence a normative regime's currency 
for international actors. First, the normative regime developed 
over time must accord with international actors' interests and val-
ues. For some actors, the morality of a decision will be the linchpin 
of its currency; there is no legitimacy without morality. Second, 
the currency of a regime may be influenced by whether the deci-
sions of the tribunal are considered legally sound, or consistent 
with commonly accepted principles or discourse of legal decision 
making. Although political acceptability (whether based on moral-
ity or not) and legal soundness appear at odds with each other, 
they are both integral to normative buy-in. Legal soundness pre-
vents a decision from appearing too political because it is 
grounded in commonly accepted legal discourse. A failure to 
understand or account for interests and values is equally dangerous 
to normative buy-in. Again, transparency assists states and other 
stakeholders in evaluating developing norms. The factors influenc-
ing normative buy-in are discussed in turn below. 
1. Norms in Accordance with Interests and Values 
For actors influencing state policy to "buy in" to a normative 
regime or for it have currency, they must find that it accords with 
their interests and values. If a tribunal makes decisions over time 
that run contrary to an international actor's interests and values, its 
legitimacy is likely to decline. Also, tribunals risk undermining 
their authority to interpret a normative regime by failing to address 
international actors' concerns external to the law, or by ignoring 
shifting ideological and political winds and moral concerns. But if 
actors' interests and values are shaped by evolving norms, decisions 
169. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT'L 
SEC., Winter 1994/95, at 5,7 (contrasting realist and institutionalist international relations 
paradigms). 
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that would not have been acceptable in the past may become more 
so. 
If a tribunal consistently makes decisions that do not coincide 
with international actors' interests and values, they will likely cease 
to perceive the tribunal as possessing justified authority. Imagine 
that a treaty sets out a standard by which a decision shall be made 
which reflects a political compromise between the parties to the 
treaty. A tribunal repeatedly interprets that provision in a manner 
inconsistent with that political compromise. As a result, parties 
may ultimately reject the tribunal's rulings as failing to accord with 
their view of what the law is or should be, undermining their will-
ingness to recur to the adjudicative body at all. 
More concretely, suppose that various states decide that the con-
tinental shelf should be delimited to achieve an "equitable solu-
tion" on the basis of "international law."17o When they ratify the 
1982 UNCLOS treaty, they have divergent views of what "equitable" 
means or what international law requires; some believe "equitable" 
means delimitation by an equidistance line in most or all cases, 
while others assert the continental shelf should be delimited by an 
alternative method, such as the angle bisector approach.171 If the 
IC] decides that "equitable" always means equidistance, states that 
prefer the angle-bisector approach may seek an alternative tribunal 
with different jurisprudence on the meaning of "equitable," or they 
may prefer a negotiated solution, or even no solution at all. Their 
disagreement with the court's rulings may translate into criticism, 
diminished will to refer disputes to the court, and perhaps even 
attempts to undermine the treaty regime or the tribunal itself. 
Another example is the le]'s 1966 judgment in the South West 
Mrica cases, which was so disappointing to Mrican and Asian states 
that concerns arose they would stop using the courtP2 Even 
170. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 83, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S.3. 
171. See, e.g., Guyana v. Suriname ~~ 210, 221 (ITLOS 2007), available at http://www. 
pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Guyana-Suriname%20Award.pdf (describing Guyana's position 
in favor of delimitation based on equidistance and Suriname's advocacy for an angle-bisec-
tor approach). 
172. See RICHARD A. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAw IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIE'IY 397 (1970). 
Falk notes: 
[Tlhe disappoinunent caused by the 1966 decision has seriously undermined 
confidence in the ICJ to such an extent-especially in the eyes of the Mro-Asian 
group-that no opportunity is likely to provide the Court with an opportunity to 
signal a revival of jurisprudential progressivism in its operations. To overcome 
this ironic situation from inhibiting recourse of the ICJ and to international adju-
dication in general it is important for observers to appreciate the combination of 
improbable circumstances that allowed the judicial conservatives to muster a 
146 The Ceo. Wash. Int'} L. Rev. [Vol. 41 
though a prior decision is binding only on the parties to the case in 
which the Court rendered the decision,173 the IC] frequently cites 
its prior rulings on similar legal issues, and states are likely to con-
sider these in evaluating the normative regime. 
The mass public's view of (at least national) tribunals depends to 
some extent on their satisfaction with specific policy outcomes over 
time.174 In their study of highest national courts in Europe and the 
United States, James Gibson, Gregory Caldeira, and Vanessa Baird 
propose that satisfaction with a court's policy outcomes ("specific 
support") over time is correlated with support for the institution 
itself ("diffuse support"), and this relationship is stronger the 
longer the court has been in existence.! 75 In other words, the 
more instances of satisfaction with the decisions of a court over 
time, the more likely mass publics will support the judicial institu-
tion.176 To the extent that mass publics shape state policy, satisfac-
tion with specific outcomes over time may significantly affect 
legitimacy. 
How a tribunal handles issues seemingly external to the norma-
tive regime may also affect its legitimacy. For example, assume that 
states conclude bilateral investment treaties with other states and 
agree to binding arbitration with investors at a time when environ-
mental concerns are only beginning to appear on the international 
stage. States then sign decades-long concession agreements with 
investors for extraction of natural resources, which lack provisions 
to protect the environment. In response to domestic and interna-
tional political pressure following an oil spill in a protected area or 
the collapse of a tailings dam into a river, a state decides to expro-
priate the natural resource or to impose sanctions on the investor. 
The investor sues for a violation of the applicable bilateral invest-
ment treaty. If domestic constituencies and states perceive that a 
tribunal fails to take such concerns into account, the tribunal will 
lose favor, and its authority may be undermined. On the other 
hand, an investor might find the tribunal to be "activist" or "too 
Id. 
majority in 1966 and the probability that the judicial conservatives will exert a 
declining influence in future activities of the IC]. 
173. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 59. 
174. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of 
National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 343, 356 (1998). The Gibson, Caldeira & Baird 
study focuses on individuals with a threshold level of awareness about their highest 
national court. Id. at 347-48. 
175. See id. at 356. 
176. See id. 
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political" if it considers factors found nowhere in the bilateral 
investment treaty. 
Shifting ideological or political winds may also affect the political 
acceptability of decisions, and thereby, the currency of a normative 
regime. Again in the context of investor-state disputes, assume that 
a corrupt dictatorship signed bilateral investment treaties with 
binding arbitration clauses, as well as a number of agreements with 
foreign investors containing terms that could easily be construed as 
unfavorable to the state (and perhaps favorable to the dictator). 
Today, host country nationals believe that the foreign investments 
have brought little to no benefit, and they elect a leader to reclaim 
their natural resources, or at least, to renegotiate terms of agree-
ments. If a tribunal persistently rules in favor of investors in such 
situations, holding that the states are treating foreign investors in a 
discriminatory manner or engaging in illegal expropriations, states 
and the domestic constituencies they represent will likely begin to 
disparage the normative regime. The tribunal's interpretations 
will be seen as too constraining on sovereign power exercised on 
behalf of the people. Tribunals may be seen as out of touch with 
reality on the ground in the litigating state. 
A normative regime'S currency may grow over time, even if tribu-
nals make decisions that appear contrary to states' and other inter-
national actors' short- or medium-term interests. An actor's 
commitment to a particular normative regime may increase if it 
perceives benefits to staying a "member of the club" that go beyond 
particular doctrinal decisions against it, or if it believes the tribu-
nal's decisions are morally justified. For example, states might 
choose to continue to consent to adjudication in human rights 
bodies despite adverse decisions because they are committed to 
human rights and their sense of justice or morality compels them 
to continue to consent to adjudication, or because they want to 
preserve the veneer of such a commitment. Similarly, even if states 
perceive bias in investment arbitrations, states and other actors 
might advocate on behalf of remaining in a dispute settlement 
mechanism because they perceive that it is a necessary prerequisite 
to attract foreign direct investmentp7 An international relations 
theorist of the Constructivist school might assert that decisions of a 
177. See, e.g., Shalakany, supra note 162, at 428 (describing the argument of a Sin-
gaporean legal scholar that "developing countries simply must accept arbitration if they are 
to attract any long-term foreign investment"). 
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tribunal over time can themselves alter state preferences and 
identity.178 
Allegiance to the transnational polity associated with the norma-
tive regime might also affect normative buy-in. Unlike national 
courts, international ones "cannot rely upon the 'presumption of 
legitimacy' associated with national institutions."179 For example, 
social-science research suggests that if citizens feel like they are a 
part of the European Union, they may be more willing to support 
the ECJ.l80 If they feel no link whatsoever to the European Union, 
however, the ECl's authority is called into question. In their dis-
cussions about the WTO, Robert Keohane andJoseph Nye suggest 
that one way to strengthen such links is through the use of inter-
mediating politicians with access to both the institutions and 
domestic constituencies.18I 
2. Legally Sound Norms 
The perception of a tribunal's decisions as "legally sound" likely 
affects the currency of a normative regime and support for the 
underlying judicial institution. In deciding disputes, international 
judges and arbitrators shape the underlying normative regime. 
Even if precedent is generally not formally binding in the interna-
tional legal system, lawyers and judges refer to previously decided 
cases as persuasive authority.I82 Consequently, tribunals' interpre-
tations of a treaty or relevant doctrine impact the kinds of argu-
ments that future litigants make, the standards that are applied to 
future disputes, and presumably the behavior of those bound by 
the normative regime. If interpretations and rulings lack particu-
lar hallmarks, international actors may perceive them as unduly 
178. See Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, INT'L SEC., Summer 1995, 
at 71, 71-72 (stating that the two basic claims of critical international relations theory, 
which includes constructivism, are "that the fundamental structures of international polit-
ics are social rather than strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these 
structures shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a claim 
that opposes rationalism)"); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998) (discussing "norm entrepreneurs" 
and the influence of membership in a community on state preferences). 
179. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8, at 464. 
180. See id. at 464-65 (suggesting that legitimacy of transnational institutions depends 
in part on citizen identification with the supranational polity, "which, in the case of the 
EU, is only beginning to emerge"). 
181. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 280. 
182. The ICJ Statute's article 38 lays out the sources of international law traditionally 
referenced by international courts, including 'judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determi-
nation of rules of law." ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 38(1) (d). 
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political, arbitrary, or biased, rather than authoritative or binding. 
To be seen as authoritative, rulings and judgments must both 
accord with interests and values and be framed in the predominant 
legal discourse. They must utilize a kind of legal reasoning or dis-
course that is commonly accepted by litigants and members of the 
treaties establishing tribunals. For domestiCl or other constituen-
cies, the form of legal discourse is probably less important than 
whether the court's decision accords with their interests and 
values. 
Franck's work on international rule legitimacy provides a useful 
delineation of the kinds of reasoning likely to be considered 
authoritative in the international context. Although Franck's pro-
ject examines what draws states to comply with international 
rules-his definition of legitimacy-the qualities of the rules he 
identifies are applicable to legal reasoning in international court 
opinions. Specifically, Franck asserts that a rule's (lack of) "deter-
minacy," "coherence," and "adherence" will affect its legitimacy, or 
ability to pull parties to compliance. If a tribunal issues rulings that 
lack these characteristics, it may undermine its own credibility. 
States are less likely to submit a case to adjudication in a tribunal 
that fails to incorporate these elements into its rulings. 
Franck states that determinacy "denotes a rule's clarity of mean-
ing," as well as "the extent to which the rule's communicative 
power exerts its own dynamic pull toward compliance."183 A legiti-
mate rule distinguishes clearly between prohibited and permitted 
conduct,184 or "is open to a process of clarification by an authority 
recognized as legitimate by those to whom the rule is 
addressed."185 Although tribunals are often faced with preexisting 
rules in the form of positive law such as treaties, the extent to 
which their decisions clarifY rules may affect their legitimacy. If a 
tribunal confuses rather than clarifies identifiable principles gov-
erning behavior, its utility will be questioned. 
The same applies to consistent application of rules to like situa-
tions-what Franck calls "coherence"-as opposed to an idiosyn-
cratic or arbitrary application.186 Coherence "legitimates a rule, 
principle, or implementing institution because it provides a reason-
183. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 84. Nonetheless, as Franck explains, a rule's clarity is not 
necessarily an indicator of its compliance pull, particularly when its clear command pro-
duces results "at variance with common sense.» Id. at 68. 
184. Id. at 57. 
185. Id. at 6l. 
186. See id. at 152. 
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able connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to 1) 
its own principled purpose, 2) principles previously employed to 
solve similar problems, and 3) a lattice of principles in use to 
resolve different problems."187 If a court applies the same rule in a 
number of different ways, those governed by the rule cannot mod-
ify their behavior to accord with the rule. Further, if a court or 
series of arbitral panels within one normative regime applies the 
same rule to identical situations yet achieves divergent outcomes, 
international actors will perceive the dispute resolution mechanism 
as arbitrary and ineffective. If litigants get no predictability from 
the dispute resolution mechanism, they may prefer to avoid it 
altogether. 
To protect against inconsistency, states have created appellate 
mechanisms for some adjudicative bodies. For example, the 
WTO's Appellate Body hears appeals on legal issues from panel 
decisions and is composed of adjudicators who serve fixed terms of 
four years.188 ICSID has no such appellate mechanism, and the 
system has been criticized for rendering inconsistent decisions. 189 
Some have also raised concerns about ICSID litigants attempting to 
utilize annulment proceedings as a form of de facto appeal,I90 Fur-
ther, ad hoc tribunals hear annulment proceedings in the ICSID 
system, not adjudicators with a fixed tenure. 191 The EC] serves as a 
court of last resort for some kinds of appeals, but it also possesses 
exclusive and original jurisdiction over others.192 The ICJ gener-
ally acts as a court of first instance for contentious cases, with no 
possibility of appeal,I93 In both the IC] and the EC], a party may 
seek to revise a judgment, but only in a very limited set of circum-
187. !d. at 147-48. 
188. DSU, supra note 28, art. 17(1)-(2). 
189. See Franck, supra note 3, at 1524, 1547-48 (noting that "because legal errors can-
not be corrected in ICSID awards, the possibility of inconsistent awards is an accepted 
realty [sic] at ICSID" and suggesting a single investment treaty arbitration appellate body 
for a number of different arbitral institutions including ICSID); Burke-White & von 
Staden, supra note 4, at 314-15 (questioning the viability of ICSID in light of inconsistent 
decisions in four cases involving the same facts and legal issue). 
190. See Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for ACCUTaq 
Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 444, 452-53 (2006) (describing 
three "generations" of annulment cases in ICSID and how they addressed the distinction 
between annulment and appeal). 
191. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 52(3). 
192. ECJ Statute, supra note 79, arts. 51, 56. For example, the ECJ has exclusive juris-
diction over actions for annulment brought by a member state against the European Par-
liament or brought by one community institution against another, and it has appellate 
jurisdiction over points of law decided by the Court of First Instance. See id. 
193. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, arts. 36, 60. 
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stances. 194 Litigants in these courts may get only one bite at the 
apple, with no corrective mechanism available in case of inconsis-
tent decisions. The existence of another layer of review to prevent 
inconsistent decision making or to establish clear rules of law may 
affect whether a state authorizes or continues to authorize a partic-
ular tribunal or court to hear its disputes. 
The extent to which adjudicators link their rulings to an "organ-
ized normative hierarchy"195 will also enhance or diminish their 
authoritativeness. Franck labels this concept "adherence": the "ver-
tical nexus between a primary rule of obligation . .. and a hierarchy of 
secondary rules identifying the sources of rules and establishing 
normative standards that define how rules are to be made, inter-
preted, and applied."196 The point is that "a rule is more likely to 
obligate if it is made within the framework of an organized norma-
tive hierarchy, than if it is merely an ad hoc agreement between 
parties in a state of nature."197 Judicial decisions that go beyond 
the primary rules of obligation-such as those found in normative 
regimes as defined in this Article-and extend to obligations 
derived from status or membership in a particular community will 
194. The ICJ Statute's article 61 states: 
1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based 
upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, 
which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also 
to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due 
to negligence. 
2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court 
expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a 
character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application 
admissible on this ground. 
3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment 
before it admits proceedings in revision. 
4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the 
discovery of the new fact. 
5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the 
date of the judgment. 
[d. art. 61. The ECJ Statute's article 44 states: 
An application for revision of a judgment may be made to the Court of Justice 
only on discovery of a fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, and 
which, when the judgment was given, was unknown to the Court and to the party 
claiming the revision. 
The revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording 
the existence of a new fact, recognising that it is of such a character as to lay the 
case open to revision and declaring the application admissible on this ground. 
No application for revision may be made after the lapse of 10 years from the 
date of the judgment. 
ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 44. 
195. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 184. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. 
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exert a stronger compliance pull. 198 International actors will per-
ceive them to be more authoritative. 
Another factor states and others may consider in evaluating the 
legal soundness of a court or tribunal's decisions is its compliance 
record. When litigants comply with a court or tribunal's judgment, 
they are announcing to the world that they accept the adjudicative 
body's decision. Every time a litigant complies with a court deci-
sion, it confers authority on the court or tribunal and on its reason-
ing or methodology. To what extent such peer pressure affects a 
state's decision to continue authorizing a court or tribunal to 
decide disputes is a matter for further empirical study. 
While legal scholars and litigants may read and analyze opinions 
to determine whether a court's decisions are legally sound, mass 
publics may be more interested in the outcome of the decisions 
themselves. It is unlikely that the man or woman on the street will 
sit down and read an entire ICJ opinion to determine whether the 
court engaged with the predominant legal discourse. Whether a 
court's reasoning is legally sound is relevant, however, to the extent 
legal scholars, litigants, or opinion leaders who might influence 
mass publics care about it. Again, this is a matter for further 
empirical study.199 
3. Transparency's Role 
International actors must have access to an adjudicative body's 
rulings and reasoning to evaluate and assess the currency of a nor-
mative regime. The importance of transparency in this regard is 
discussed in Part III.C below. 
In sum, the currency of a normative regime is likely to affect 
whether international actors perceive the tribunal interpreting it as 
possessing justified authority. Currency is influenced both by the 
coincidence of the court's decisions with international actors' 
interests and values, and by the perceived legal soundness of those 
decisions, although the former is likely more important for mass 
publics. If adjudicators go too far in favoring particular interests 
over legal soundness or vice versa, they may threaten the legitimacy 
of the tribunals on which they serve. Transparency is an important 
prerequisite for allowing international actors to assess and evaluate 
a normative regime's currency. 
198. See id. at 190-9l. 
199. See Gibson, supra note 5, at 489·91 (asserting that opinion leaders' views of proce· 
dural faimess might impact the mass public's support for a judicial institution). 
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C. Transparency and Democratic Norms 
Transparency affects the legitimacy of international tribunals 
both directly and indirectly. First, transparency is indirectly linked 
to legitimacy because it allows interested parties to assess whether a 
tribunal is fair and unbiased and to decide whether to continue to 
buy in to a tribunal's interpretation and application of a particular 
normative regime. Without access to information about a tribu-
nal's functioning and reasoning, no such assessments can occur. 
Second, transparency is directly linked to legitimacy because it is a 
democratic norm and permits some degree of accountability. The 
extent to which an institution is infused with such democratic 
norms may affect its legitimacy in the eyes of some interested 
parties. 
A "transparent" tribunal is one in which interested parties, both 
inside and outside the judicial process, can observe its processes 
and outcomes.200 A proceeding is transparent "if it can be seen 
through easily, 'just as one can easily see through a clean win-
dOW."'201 The purpose of transparency in this context is to allow 
interested parties to evaluate the decision making and functioning 
of a tribunal. Transparent tribunals also provide principals with 
the ability to assess how well their agents are representing them in 
judicial proceedings. Citizens of a state can reach conclusions 
about their government's behavior and effectiveness before a tribu-
200. Transparency is variously defined. See, e.g., JackJ. Coe,Jr., Transparency in the Reso-
lution of Investor-State Disputes-Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFrA Leadership, 54 U. RAN. L. 
REv. 1339, 1339 ("extent to which the public may be alerted to, gain information about, 
and perhaps participate in, proceedings organized to adjudicate an investor's claim"); Jef-
frey T. Cook, The Evolution of Investment-State Dispute Resolution in NAFrA and CAFrA: Wild 
West to World Order, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 1085, noo (2007) ("the full and timely disclosure of 
information"); Ann Fiorini, The End of Secrecy, FOREIGN POL'y, Summer 1998, at 50, 50 ("the 
opposite of secrecy"); Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 54 U. RAN. L. REv. 1301, 1306 (2006) ("the ready availability to 'interested parties' of 
the rules that regulate an adjudicatory decision-making process"). A state's transparency is 
linked to "legal, political, and institutional structures that make information about the 
internal characteristics of a government and society available to actors both inside and 
outside of the domestic politic system." Bernard I. Finel & Kristin M. Lord, The Su1frrising 
Logic of Transparency, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 315, 316 (1999). An institution's transparency may 
also be defined as "any kind of measure that publicizes information about an institution's 
behavior, such as monitoring, reporting, or simply responding to inquiries." Thomas N. 
Hale & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Transparency: Possibilities and Limitations, FLETCHER F. WORLD 
AFF., Winter 2006, at 153, 153. 
201. Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Note, Transparency: An Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental 
Principle in International Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 579, 583 (2006) (citing William 
B. T. Mock, An Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A Tool for Rational Develop-
ment, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 293, 295 (2000)). 
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nal. Transparency is traditionally linked to accountability.202 
Armed with knowledge gained through transparency, international 
actors may shape the behavior of adjudicators and litigants and 
work to influence institutions. 
A number of different options are available for enhancing the 
transparency of tribunals. A transparent tribunal might hold open 
hearings with translation into the languages of the litigating parties 
and produce minutes of its proceedings for public access in rele-
vant languages.203 It might make pleadings of pending and past 
cases and the names of adjudicators and parties publicly available. 
A tribunal might also issue written decisions listing the names of 
adjudicators and including explicit reasoning, dissenting, concur-
ring, and separate opinions, vote tallies, and signatures. Table 4 
demonstrates the differences between several tribunals with regard 
to these various options.204 Not all tribunals employ the same 
approach to transparency. For example, the ECl has no concur-
ring, dissenting, or separate opinions, and its opinions are 
unsigned and include no vote tallies. ICl opinions, on the other 
hand, contain all of these elements. 
Table 4 does not capture some nuances that may be relevant 
when assessing a tribunal's transparency. For example, although 
tribunals may publish opinions, the information they convey may 
vary tremendously. As Mitchel Lasser points out in a comparative 
study of the ECj, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the French Cour de 
Cassation, ECl opinions are more formulaic and contain less 
insight into judicial reasoning than those of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 205 Despite these differences, Lasser argues that the ECl 
enhances transparency by publishing Advocate General opinions, 
which typically grapple with relevant case law and academic writ-
202. See, e.g., Hale & Slaughter, supra note 200, at 153; Buys, supra note 14, at 134 ("To 
the extent that public international arbitrations are made more transparent, democratic 
ideals are enhanced because the public has the opportunity to observe the process and 
hold the governments accountable for their actions with respect to the arbitration and for 
the result. If the public is dissatisfied with its government's actions, it can express that 
dissatisfaction at the ballot box."). 
203. The issue of the language of a proceeding may appear insignificant at first glance. 
Nonetheless, in cases where the official languages of the court do not include the lan-
guages of the litigants, transparency becomes harder to achieve and more costly because of 
translation costs. 
204. See infra Part V tbl. 4. 
205. See MITCHEL DE S. -0. -L'E. LAsSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALY-
SIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 16, 21-23 (2004) (describing the ECJ as a 
fusion of the French institutional and the American argumentative approaches while not 
"going far enough in either direction to solve the problems or to take advantage of the 
possibilities of either"). 
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ings.206 These Advocate General opinions give the public addi-
tional insight into the legal debates infonning judicial opinions, 
even if the debates are not always explicitly addressed in the judi-
cial opinions themselves.207 The close analysis that Lasser does of 
the opinions of these three courts is a model for the kind of com-
parative analysis that will yield more insight into additional trans-
parency-enhancing features. 
Transparency is an important indirect legitimacy-influencing fac-
tor because it pennits international actors to assess whether a tribu-
nal is treating litigants in a fair and unbiased manner, both in its 
processes and decisions. More specifically, transparency allows 
domestic constituencies, interested litigating and nonlitigating 
states, academics, and other "court watchers" to evaluate the func-
tioning of the adjudicative body, and the behavior and judgments 
of adjudicators. Court watchers cannot assess whether a tribunal 
and its adjudicators treat the parties fairly and impartially if the 
doors to the courtroom are locked. Open hearings allow court 
watchers to observe the implementation of procedural rules, such 
as how much time each party is given to present its case and 
whether both parties are treated with respect by the judicial panel. 
Similarly, access to preliminary decisions and judgments, their rea-
soning, and separate, concurring, and dissenting opinions allows 
interested parties to determine whether individual adjudicators or 
benches and panels made their decisions based on legally sound 
reasoning in the predominant legal discourse, pure bias, or by flip-
ping a coin. Conclusions about a court's processes and decisions 
can profoundly affect whether an international actor views a tribu-
nal as authorized to decide disputes. 
Neither can interested parties fonn opinions about their own 
normative buy-in if judgments and their reasoning are not made 
public. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for a state or other 
party bound by a normative regime to discern definitively what 
legal rules are, or how they may be implemented and applied, if no 
explanation accompanies decisions, much less whether they were 
made in a legally sound manner. Nor can court watchers grasp the 
state of the debate surrounding a legal issue without some indica-
tion of what adjudicators considered in their decision making and 
of what was controversial. Transparent opinions may influence the 
content of a normative regime by affecting the development of 
206. See id. at 16, 20fi.08, 228. 
207. See id. at 236-38. 
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legal principles and by leading to consistency in opinions.208 
Although stare decisis does not formally apply, prior opinions on 
similar issues are highly persuasive.209 At a minimum, judges and 
arbitrators are forced to grapple with another person or tribunal's 
approach to the same problem. Further, the strength or weakness 
of the reasoning provided in an opinion may affect its political 
acceptability, an important component in maintaining a normative 
regime's currency. 
Transparency not only influences legitimacy indirectly by 
allowing interested parties to come to conclusions about a tribu-
nal's bias and their own normative buy-in, but also, it may have 
independent force as a free-standing democratic norm.210 Keo-
hane and Nye suggest that the legitimacy of the WTO, for example, 
is linked to the presence or absence of such norms, including 
transparency.211 In their view, a lack of transparency and opportu-
nities to participate undermines legitimacy because the public 
"does not trust the honesty and legitimacy of secret proceed-
ings."212 Open hearings show that neither the parties nor the tri-
bunal "has anything to hide."213 Keohane and Nye further assert 
that democratic societies habitually demand transparency of insti-
tutions "that allocate values profoundly affecting people's lives" by 
requiring them to publish results, reasoning, and disagreement, 
and the same applies to organizations like the WTO.214 
208. See Coe, supra note 200, at 1356-57; Buys, supra note 14, at 136. 
209. Buys, supra note 14, at 136. 
210. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 281-82 ("[I]n the contemporary world, dem-
ocratic norms are increasingly applied to international institutions as a test of their legiti-
macy. If international institutions are to be legitimate, therefore, their practices and the 
results of their activities need to meet broadly democratic standards."). But see Daniel C. 
Esty, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQuI'IY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYS-
TEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 34, at 301,301 (rejecting Keohane and Nye's reliance 
on "global popular sovereignty" and instead asserting that "legitimacy of a governing body 
in the modern world derives interactively from the degree to which it reflects the will of a 
political community ... and the reason or rationality of the outcomes it generates"). 
211. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 265, 276. Keohane and Nye also discuss the 
importance of participation-or opportunities to "make one's views known," as well as the 
presence of politicians with ties to both institutions and constituencies. See id. at 277-81; 
FIorini, supra note 200, at 52 (suggesting that transparency is spreading throughout the 
world, along with democratization and globalization). 
212. Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 277 (quoting Robert E. Hudec, The New vvro 
Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN.]. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 45 
(1999)). 
213. Coe, supra note 200, at 1361. 
214. Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 277. But see Robert E. Hudec, Comment, in 
EFFICIENCY, EQuI'IY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLEN-
NIUM, supra note 34, at 295, 298 (questioning the basis for asking an international "mem-
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Transparency is also linked to legitimacy through the concept of 
accountability.215 Transparency allows constituencies of accounta-
ble actors, such as adjudicators and litigants, not only to observe 
them, but also to attempt to exert some degree of control over 
their behavior. For adjudicators, relevant constituencies might 
include the litigating parties, nonlitigating parties to the relevant 
normative regime, other adjudicators, scholars, lawyers, and the 
public at large. For state litigants, relevant constituencies might 
include the electorate, political party members, special interest 
groups such as NGOs, and the media,216 as well as other members 
of the international community including states, parties to relevant 
treaties, and international NGOs. Private litigants such as public 
companies might be accountable to shareholders and other private 
and public actors. 
Transparency allows constituencies to shape behavior in at least 
two ways. First, the mere knowledge that they are being watched 
may affect behavior: "[t]ransparency regulates by deterring actions 
that are unlikely to withstand public scrutiny."217 In other words, if 
judges and arbitrators know that their opinions will be read and 
reviewed, they will think twice before putting pen to paper. The 
act of publication makes arbitrators and judges more cautious and 
heightens their sensitivity to the environment in which they are act-
ing. Similarly, representatives of domestic constituencies or share-
holders will review their own declarations and legal strategies with 
a different lens if they know they are being observed. When a hear-
ing is open, litigants have more than just one audience-the tribu-
nal-to please. 
Transparency also allows constituencies to shape behavior 
because if adjudicators and litigants act in a way that is perceived as 
unacceptable or highly undesirable by relevant constituencies, they 
may suffer consequences. The consequences themselves may cut 
short aberrant adjudicator behavior, and awareness of possible 
consequences may shape behavior. For example, if an adjudicator 
ber-driven organization" like the WTO to "meet the legitimacy standards of an institution 
with powers of governance"). 
215. See Hale & Slaughter, supra note 200, at 153 (stating that transparency is tradition-
ally linked to accountability); Buys, supra note 14, at 134; Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 
291 ("Whatever form accountability takes, transparency will be crucial to ensure that 
accountability is meaningful."). 
216. Barry Leon & John Terry, Special Considerations When a State is a Party to Interna-
tional Arbitration, DISP. REsoL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2006, at 69, 72. 
217. R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization of American Law, 58 INT'L 
ORG. 103, 106 (2004). 
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fails to engage in legally sound reasoning or widely exceeds the 
bounds of political acceptability, the adjudicator may suffer profes-
sional reputational damage or may not be chosen to serve as an 
arbitrator or judge in the future. 218 Conversely, decisions that 
strike the right balance may be rewarded. The idea that judges and 
arbitrators are rewarded or punished based on outcome or reason-
ing appears problematic when juxtaposed with ideals such as judi-
cial independence, moral courage, and impartiality. Yet 
international judges and arbitrators, like domestic ones, must 
straddle the line between producing politically acceptable opinions 
and utilizing legally sound rhetoric. States may decide to limit a 
tribunal's funding if they are dissatisfied with outcomes or simply 
never use it to decide any disputes. Without these sorts of 
restraints on adjudicator and tribunal behavior, both the norma-
tive regimes and the tribunals themselves might be endangered. 
In addition, transparency allows domestic and other constituen-
cies to hold governments accountable for their actions and 
results.219 The link between holding litigants accountable and 
legitimacy may be that for some international actors, the inability 
to monitor what their agent is doing taints the entire judicial or 
arbitral process. By having access to information about their state's 
actions, domestic constituencies can make informed decisions 
about the authority or legitimacy they wish to confer on their own 
political representatives. Consequently, transparency enhances 
democratic ideals.220 
Transparency may also make some international actors less likely 
to authorize tribunals to decide their disputes. For example, open 
hearings or other measures increasing transparency may be disrup-
tive, costly, or heighten the vulnerability of information litigants 
218. See, e.g., Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 277 ("[The United States Supreme 
Court and the Federal Reserve Board] are held accountable through criticisms by profes-
sional networks, such as legal scholars writing in law journals and economists writing schol-
arly articles and offering opinions in the public media. Without transparency, these means 
of accountability would be eviscerated."); Buys, supra note 14, at 137 (arguing that the 
publication of arbitral awards will assist future parties in selection of arbitrators for their 
disputes); Coe, supra note 200, at 1356 (arguing that publication of awards "exposes the 
tribunal's work to scrutiny by the academic and practice communities, supplying a species 
of peer review"); Rogers, supra note 200, at 1306 (asserting that "the general aim of trans-
parency is to facilitate monitoring the adjudicator"). 
219. Cook, supra note 200, at nol. 
220. See, e.g., Buys, supra note 14, at 134 ("To the extent that public international arbi-
trations are made more transparent, democratic ideas are enhanced because the public 
has the opportunity to observe the process and hold the governments accountable for their 
actions with respect to the arbitration and for the result. If the public is dissatisfied with its 
government's actions, it can express that dissatisfaction at the ballot box."). 
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may want to keep secret.221 Providing translations of pleadings, 
hearings, and judgments in a number of different languages is 
expensive and may lengthen filing times and proceedings. Confi-
dentiality may be preferable when it allows parties to keep damag-
ing allegations out of the public eye and prevents outsiders from 
gaining access to confidential government or business information 
such as trade secrets.222 On the other hand, purported principals, 
such as domestic constituencies and shareholders, might prefer to 
shine light on damaging allegations, and procedures can be 
tweaked to protect sensitive information that is not necessary to 
ensure accountability. 
Complete transparency may occasionally aggravate conflict and 
prevent negotiated dispute settlement. Bernard Finel and Kristin 
Lord assert that transparency can exacerbate crises "by overwhelm-
ing diplomatic signals with the 'noise' of domestic politics and con-
fusing opponents about which domestic voices are authoritative 
expressions of state policy."223 Litigants in a transparent tribunal 
might be forced to frame their arguments to appease particular 
interest groups or powerful domestic constituencies rather than to 
arrive at a reasonable solution. If the government was elected by 
those constituencies, however, perhaps democratic accountability 
obligates the government to frame its arguments in their rhetoric. 
Despite some possible drawbacks that are difficult to reconcile 
with democratic principles, transparency probably is correlated 
positively with legitimacy. Transparency provides international 
actors insights about a tribunal's independence and impartiality 
and the development of the normative regime the tribunal is 
charged with interpreting and applying. Further, transparency 
may itself influence the normative regime by requiring adjudica-
tors to grapple with prior decision making on the same or similar 
issues, perhaps leading to greater consistency in the law. Finally, as 
a democratic norm linked to accountability, transparency may 
directly confer legitimacy on an adjudicative body. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When states (or the actors who influence and shape state prefer-
ences) submit a dispute or category of disputes to international 
adjudication, they choose to forego some amount of their sover-
eignty in favor of other values. For example, by joining ICSID, 
221. Coe, supra note 200, at 1361-62. 
222. Buys, supra note 14, at 137. 
223. Finel & Lord, supra note 200, at 315. 
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states limit their range of options for handling economic crises in 
favor of a perception that they are attracting investment. Agreeing 
to allow an ITLOS tribunal to undertake a maritime delimitation is 
an affirmative choice for peaceful dispute resolution over tradi-
tional approaches, such as the use of force. States commit them-
selves to particular human rights principles by submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, limiting 
the policy choices available to governments for handling dissenting 
views. So long as these trade-offs are considered worthwhile, 
strengthening the legitimacy of international adjudicative bodies is 
essential. To that end, and in light of states' increasing recourse to 
international adjudicative bodies, this Article seeks to spark discus-
sion about legitimacy. 
Specifically, this Article proposes that legitimacy should be 
understood as the perception that an international adjudicative 
body possesses justified authority, and that this perception may vary 
over time and across different international actors who may influ-
ence state preferences. The Article further suggests that an inter-
national court will be perceived as legitimate if it is (1) fair and 
unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent with 
what states believe the law is or should be, and (3) transparent and 
infused with democratic norms. By moving beyond legal legiti-
macy and focusing on what underpins authority, rather than what 
pulls toward compliance or a sense of obligation to international 
legal rules, this Article hopes to reframe scholarly inquiry about 
legitimacy and international courts from a theoretical standpoint 
and spur empirical research on the topic. Such research might test 
the hypotheses generated in this paper, consider the relationship 
between different drivers of legitimacy, and seek to understand the 
link between different constituencies' perceptions of legitimacy 
and the decisions of a state to consent or not to adjudication in a 
tribunal. Both theoretical and empirical scholarship about legiti-
macy and international courts can make a real difference to institu-
tional reformers and those interested in strengthening the 
underlying normative regimes that international courts interpret 
and apply. 
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